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Corporate Governance Reform for the 21st Century: 
A Critical Reassessment of the Shareholder 
Primacy Model
CAROL LIAO*
This article questions the effi ciency of the shareholder 
primacy model of corporate governance in light of 
the fi nancial calamities that have plagued the fi rst 
decade of the 21st century. Reform efforts following 
the global fi nancial crisis have focused on failures in 
securities regulation, but that is only part of the story. 
Effective reform measures must also address the legal 
and normative prescriptions found within existing 
governance structures, and the collateral effect those 
prescriptions have on political and regulatory inaction.
There was strong ideological support for the 
shareholder primacy model at the start of the century. 
Following the corporate and accounting scandals of 
2001 and 2002, three scholarly perspectives emerged 
addressing the effectiveness of the model.This article 
continues the dialogue on those perspectives and 
examines two factors that contributed to the collapse 
of the US subprime mortgage market: the repeal of 
the Glass-Steagall Act and the originate-to-distribute 
model of lending. The examination reveals how the 
shareholder primacy model played a key role in the 
onslaught of the global fi nancial crisis by incentivizing 
the obstruction of effi cient regulation. Alongside this 
analysis is an interwoven account of the evolution of 
law and economics scholarship. The article provides 
a timely outlook on how the shareholder primacy 
model encourages corporate behaviour that perpe-
tuates the likelihood of future crises. It concludes by 
offering potential solutions for reform.
Dans cet article, on s’interroge sur l’effi cacité du 
modèle de la primauté des actionnaires dans le cadre 
de la gouvernance d’entreprise à la lumière des 
désastres fi nanciers qui ont marqué la première dé-
cennie du 21e siècle. Les projets de réforme qui ont 
suivi la crise fi nancière mondiale se sont concentrés 
sur les lacunes de la règlementation des valeurs mobi-
lières, mais ce n’est là qu’une partie du problème. Si 
l’on veut que les mesures de réforme aient une réelle 
effi cacité, il faut également s’attaquer aux prescrip-
tions juridiques et normatives que l’on retrouve 
dans les structures de gouvernance existantes et 
l’incidence collatérale que ces prescriptions ont sur 
l’inaction en matière politique et réglementaire. 
Le modèle de la primauté des actionnaires 
a bénéfi cié d’un fort appui idéologique au début 
du siècle. Dans la foulée des scandales fi nanciers 
et comptables de 2001 et 2002, trois perspectives 
savantes se sont penchées sur la question de l’effi -
cacité de ce modèle. L’auteur de cet article poursuit 
le dialogue amorcé par ces différentes perspectives 
et analyse deux des facteurs ayant contribué à 
l’effondrement du marché des prêts hypothécaires 
américains à risque : l’abrogation de la Glass-Steagall 
Act et le modèle d’octroi puis de cession du crédit. 
Cette analyse permet de dégager la manière dont le 
modèle de la primauté des actionnaires a joué un rôle 
déterminant dans le déclenchement de la crise fi nan-
cière mondiale en incitant à l’obstruction d’une régle-
mentation effi cace. Elle s’accompagne d’un compte 
rendu entrelacé de l’évolution de l’érudition en 
matière de droit et d’économie. Cet article présente 
une perspective tout à fait d’actualité sur la manière 
dont le modèle de la primauté des actionnaires 
encourage chez les entreprises un comportement 
qui perpétue la probabilité de futures crises. Il con-
clut en offrant d’éventuelles solutions de réforme.
* Ph.D. Student, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law; Liu Scholar, Liu Institute for Global 
Issues. The author would like to thank Jack Buchan, Gordon Christie, Mirjam Eggen, Cristie Ford, 
Janis Sarra and the editors and anonymous reviewers of the Ottawa Law Review for helpful comments 
on earlier drafts. A further thanks is given to Vickie Cammack, Patricia Carlton, Douglas Harris, 
John and Patricia Hogarth, the Honourable Madam Justice Risa Levine, Coro Strandberg, Claire 
Young, Steve and Susan Liao, Diana Liao, Roger Liao, Daniel and Heather Fogden, Kyle Fogden, Lucy 
Hai-Le Fogden and Skye Hai-Ling Fogden for the additional support. All errors are the author’s own.
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The fi nancial calamities that have marked the fi rst decade of the 21st century 
indicate it is time to pose new challenges to the assumed effi ciencies of the shareholder 
primacy model of corporate governance. As the facts behind the global fi nancial 
crisis continue to unfold, reform efforts have focused on failures within securities 
regulation—but that is only part of the story. While the shareholder primacy model 
may be ideologically entrenched in the United States of America (US), the severity 
of the crisis calls for a reassessment on the merits of this mainstream corporate 
governance model. 
It is important to recognize that the account in this article is based on US 
sources, and addresses US-specifi c issues. The global fi nancial crisis clearly affected 
many other nations, among which the causes and timelines may differ. Part II of this 
article looks back in time to the corporate and accounting scandals that immobilized 
the US fi nancial markets between 2001 and 2002. It fi rst identifi es the prevalent 
support of the shareholder primacy model prior to the scandals, and then traces 
three scholarly perspectives that emerged shortly thereafter. The fi rst group of scholars 
supported laissez-faire market principles and felt the demise of companies embroiled 
in the scandals only evidenced that the market was working effectively. The second 
group called for stricter market regulations to support the existing governance model.
The third group believed nothing less than a fundamental rethinking of corporate 
governance practices was required, and pushed for deep normative and structural 
reform. Within law and economics scholarship, the scandals marked a period when 
behavioural approaches began to gain greater momentum and infl uence in the fi eld.
Part III then delves into an analysis of some of the factors that contributed 
to the collapse of the subprime mortgage market (recognized as the fi rst in a series 
of events that have come to defi ne the global fi nancial crisis): the repeal of the 
Glass-Steagall Act1 and subsequent development of large fi nancial conglomerates 
Corporate Governance Reform for the 21st Century: 
A Critical Reassessment of the Shareholder 
Primacy Model
CAROL LIAO
1 Banking Act of 1933, Pub L No 73-66, 48 Stat 162 (codifi ed as amended in scattered sections of 12 
USC). Also known as the Glass-Steagall Act [GSA].
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and “shadow banks;”2 and the development of the originate-to-distribute model of 
lending in an unregulated over-the-counter derivatives market. The narrative behind 
the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act exposes how regulators can be intimately involved 
with the corporate entities that they govern, and cannot be relied upon as sole 
protectors of broader stakeholder interests. In the narrative behind the originate-to-
distribute model of lending, the competitive need to generate profi t induced several 
mortgage lending institutions to use questionable and even predatory lending tactics 
on potential borrowers. The examination shows how intensive lobbying efforts by 
interested corporate institutions essentially forced legislators to roll back anti-
predatory lending laws.
In Part IV, key scholarly perspectives that emerged in the aftermath of 
the crisis are identifi ed and incorporated into the three perspectives examined in 
Part II to reveal how positions have changed since the scandals of 2001 and 2002. 
The article highlights how the legal and ideological support of the shareholder 
primacy model of governance has laid the groundwork for corporate behaviour 
that heavily infl uences regulatory inaction and perpetuates the likelihood of future 
crises. Part V concludes by offering elements from both old and new institutional 
law and economics approaches as a starting point to recalibrate effi ciencies within 
the existing governance model, and then provides examples from emerging hybrid 
corporate structures as potential solutions for reform.
Power and control issues among corporate actors, and the placement of 
incentives that support existing power arrangements, are only amplifi ed when 
viewed from within an industry capable of impacting the economic health and well-
being of so many. Several types of corporate and fi nancial institutions played key roles 
in the crisis. It was a large-scale event that involved a signifi cant cast of characters: 
banks, shadow banks, mortgage lending institutions, credit rating agencies and 
trade and lobby groups, among others. The governance of fi nancial institutions may 
statutorily differ in many ways from that of large, public corporations, but there are 
intricate and delicate commonalities found in the balancing of relationships between 
the actors familiar to both types of institutions: directors, offi cers, shareholders and 
other stakeholders. The events of the crisis highlight how similar norms pervade 
the structural makeup of both corporate and fi nancial institutions. The prescriptive 
model that drives the ongoing development and application of corporate and 
regulatory law is what matters. Reforming that model is the key to bringing about 
lasting change to the way corporate and fi nancial institutions conduct themselves 
going forward.
2 Shadow banks can be defi ned as “fi nancial institutions [such as mutual funds, investment banks and 
hedge funds] that in some respects parallel banking activities but are subject to less regulation than 
commercial banks.” Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final 
Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States 
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Offi ce, 2011) at 543, online: US Government Printing 
Offi ce <http://www.gpo.gov>.
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II. LAW, ECONOMICS AND THE SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY MODEL
A. Shareholder Primacy at its Peak
In their well-known 2001 article “The End of History for Corporate Law,” Henry 
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman argued that the basic law of corporate governance 
had already achieved a high degree of uniformity to the shareholder primacy model and 
that “continuing convergence toward [this] single, standard model is likely.”3 According 
to Hansmann and Kraakman, some key normative principles in this consensus include: 
1) ultimate control over the corporation should rest with the 
shareholder class;
2) the managers of the corporation should be charged with the obli-
gation to manage the corporation in the interests of its shareholders;
3) other corporate constituencies, such as creditors, employees, 
suppliers, and customers [which, together with shareholders, 
are included as “stakeholders”], should have their interests 
protected by contractual and regulatory means rather than 
through participation in corporate governance; 
4) noncontrolling shareholders should receive strong protection 
from exploitation at the hands of controlling shareholders; and
5) the market value of the publicly traded corporation’s shares is 
the principal measure of its shareholders’ interests.4 
 Arguing from an Anglo-American perspective, Hansmann and Kraakman 
believed that alternative governance models (identifi ed by them as manager-
oriented, labour-oriented and state-oriented) had already been tried and had failed.5 
3 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, “The End of History for Corporate Law” (2001) 89:2 Geo LJ 
439 at 439.
4 Ibid at 440-41. There seems to be little contention in legal scholarship regarding Hansmann and 
Kraakman’s defi nition of shareholder primacy. See e.g. Stephen M Bainbridge, “Director Primacy: The 
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance” (2003) 97:2 Nw UL Rev 547 at 573 (which describes two 
principles of shareholder primacy: the shareholder wealth maximization norm and the principle of ulti-
mate shareholder control); Jill E Fisch, “Measuring Effi ciency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder 
Primacy” (2006) 31:3 J Corp L 637 (which asserts that shareholder primacy “defi nes the objective of 
the corporation as maximization of shareholder wealth” at 637); Ian B Lee, “Effi ciency and Ethics in the 
Debate about Shareholder Primacy”(2006) 31:2 Del J Corp L 533 (which defi nes shareholder primacy 
as “the view that managers’ fi duciary duties require them to maximize the shareholders’ wealth and 
preclude them from giving independent consideration to the interests of other constituencies” at 535).
5 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3 at 443-47. Hansmann and Kraakman describe the manager-oriented 
model as one that existed between the 1930s and the 1960s in the US; the labour-oriented model as one 
that peaked in Germany in the 1970s and caused the Commission of the European Communities to draft 
the Amended Proposal for a Fifth Company Law Directive Founded on Article 54 (3) (G) of the Treaty Concerning the 
Structure of Public Limited Companies and the Powers and Obligations of their Organs, [1983] OJ C240/2; and 
the state-oriented model as one most extensively realized in France and Japan post-World War II. The 
examination of these historical and international governance systems is beyond the scope of this article.
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Pointing to the shareholder primacy model’s assumed effi ciencies and its historical 
economic domination, they contended that the ideological convergence of this 
model is unlikely to be undone, especially since “no important competitors to the 
standard model of corporate governance remain persuasive ….”6 US confi dence 
in the shareholder primacy model was at its peak. To Hansmann and Kraakman, 
the ideological convergence toward the model meant that general convergence in 
practice would eventually follow—thus signifying, for all intents and purposes, an 
end of history for corporate law.7 
Economic effi ciency was the main force behind Hansmann and Kraakman’s 
presumption of the long-term international acceptance of shareholder primacy. 
They identifi ed profi t maximization, historical success and international competitive 
advantage as factors that “made the virtues of [the shareholder primacy] model 
increasingly salient.”8 Their logic is in line with the beliefs held by scholars of 
the Chicago School of law and economics, who have frequently used an Anglo-
American view of neoclassical economic theory and effi ciency analysis to explain 
and understand the development of law. 
Scholars within the Chicago School generally accept and adhere to principles 
that have been at the core of modern economics since Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the  Wealth of Nations,9 a work many Chicago scholars cite with 
regularity.10 A defi ning characteristic of the Chicago School is its contention that 
legal rules and outcomes can be assessed on the basis of their effi ciencies.11 Richard 
Posner, recognized as the foremost leading proponent of the Chicago School,12 was 
6 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3 at 454.
7 Ibid at 455. There is considerable discourse available on the issue of the global convergence of 
corporate governance, both prior to and following Hansmann and Kraakman’s work. See e.g. John C 
Coffee Jr, “The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance 
and its Implications” (1999) 93:3 Nw UL Rev 641; Jeffrey N Gordon & Mark J Roe, eds, Convergence 
and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
8 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3 at 449.
9 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the  Wealth of Nations, 7th ed, Eighteenth Century 
Collections Online, (1776).
10 See Steven G Medema, “Adam Smith and the Chicago School” in Ross B Emmett, ed, The Elgar Com-
panion to the Chicago School of Economics (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2010) at 40 (where he states, 
“[t]here is … no question that the Chicago School has both claimed and evidenced a close affi nity with 
Smith—directly or indirectly—for three-quarters of a century”).
11 See generally Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 7th ed (New York: Aspen, 2007) at 13 
[Posner, Economic Analysis (7th ed)] (where despite a variety of measures surrounding the concept of 
effi ciency, Posner points out that the common operating defi nition in economics is “nine times of 
out of ten” in reference to Kaldor-Hicks effi ciency). Under Kaldor-Hicks effi ciency, an outcome is 
considered more effi cient if the monetary value of society’s resources is maximized. If the marginal 
willingness to pay by those who benefi t from an action is equal to the marginal willingness to accept 
payment by those harmed, Kaldor-Hicks effi ciency contends that all parties end up no worse off than 
before (assuming those harmed are paid directly or indirectly by those benefi ting or their proxies). 
12 See e.g. Nicholas Mercuro & Steven G Medema, Economics and the Law: From Posner to Postmodernism 
and Beyond, 2d ed (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006) at 94 (which states, “[t]he work of 
[Chicago School law and economics] scholars—of whom Posner as professor, scholar, and judge is 
perhaps the foremost exponent—forms the core of the Chicago approach”).
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one of the fi rst to advance the effi ciency hypothesis in detail.13 The Chicago School’s 
application of neoclassical economics to legal theory has meant that principles 
surrounding rational maximizers who respond to price incentives are considered 
when implementing and applying legal rules to market and non-market subjects.14 
Applying the principles of neoclassical law and economics on a global market level, 
one sees how the singular objective of a higher share price within the shareholder 
primacy model (the “shareholder wealth maximization norm”15) is legitimized in 
theory, providing a necessary “invisible hand” of self-interest to promote effi cient 
outcomes within the supply and demand of the free market.16 
Using this measure in a corporate law context, the existing shareholder 
primacy model can purport to be bolstered by neoclassical effi ciency analysis. 
Hansmann and Kraakman have pointed to the standard model’s many notable eco-
nomic advantages, some of which they list as  “access to equity capital at lower cost 
(including, conspicuously, start-up capital), more aggressive development of new 
product markets… and more rapid abandonment of ineffi cient investments.”17 The 
common concerns surrounding effi ciency and wealth maximization relate to agency 
costs associated with divergent objectives between managers and shareholders. 
While recognizing that “the problem of agency costs … limits the effi cient 
size of fi rms,”18 Posner has contended that, within the separation of ownership and 
control, agency costs are generally contained. In his 1998 edition of Economic Analysis 
of Law, Posner stated, “[m]ismanagement is not in the managers’ self-interest; it is 
in fact very much contrary to their self-interest, as it will lead eventually to the 
bankruptcy of the fi rm (and of the managers’ future employment prospects), as a 
result of the competition of better managed rivals.”19 Agency costs relating to any 
divergent interests in the manager-shareholder relationship will likely be addressed 
through protective features within a company’s charter and bylaws, which Posner 
believes “shareholders would normally insist upon….”20 Hansmann and Kraakman as 
well state that the shareholder primacy model has “stronger incentives to reorganize 
along lines that are managerially coherent….”21 In addition, norms analysis has 
played a greater role in law and economics scholarship in recent decades. Janis Sarra 
notes, “[l]aw and economics scholars have used norms analysis to explain particular 
13 Other founding scholars of the Chicago School, notably Ronald Coase, Guido Calabresi, Henry 
Manne and Gary Becker, have also made signifi cant contributions to the study of effi ciency in law and 
economics research. See e.g. ibid at 94-102.
14 Posner, Economic Analysis (7th ed), supra note 11 at 4.
15 See e.g. Bainbridge, supra note 4; Fisch, supra note 4; Lee, supra note 4 (for defi nitions of the concept). 
16 Smith, supra note 9 (who famously stated: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, 
or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” at 22). 
17 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3 at 450-51.
18 Posner, Economic Analysis (7th ed), supra note 11 at 420.
19 Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 5th ed (New York: Aspen, 1998) at 452. Note, however, 
that the comment did not appear in the next edition.
20 Ibid.
21 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3 at 451.
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corporate conduct that does not easily fi t into the pure market-driven conception 
of the corporation, suggesting that corporate offi cers… [are] infl uenced by norms 
that bridge the gap between effi ciency-enhancing activity and duties of care and 
loyalty.”22 
B. Three Perspectives Following the Corporate and Accounting Scandals of 2001 
and 2002
Hansmann and Kraakman’s article was published in early 2001, prior to the fall of 
Enron Corporation (Enron) and a number of other corporate and accounting scandals 
that devastated the fi nancial markets in the latter half of 2001 through to 2002. 
Readers are advised to consult the extensive documentation and analysis of Enron’s 
collapse that is available,23 but in brief, Enron’s bankruptcy resulted from unlawful 
transgressions by its managers, which included non-transparent fi nancial reporting, 
mark-to-market accounting and the creation of complex corporate structures for 
the sole purpose of concealing billions of dollars in debt.24 Once this information 
was revealed to the public, the outrage expressed by investors, employees, pension 
holders and politicians was palpable.25 Following in rapid succession after the fall of 
Enron was a series of other corporate and accounting scandals that brought down 
several other companies, including most notably WorldCom,26 whose bankruptcy 
quickly replaced Enron’s as the largest in history.27 Its downfall was due in part 
22 Janis Sarra, “Oversight, Hindsight, and Foresight: Canadian Corporate Governance through the 
Lens of Global Capital Markets” in Janis Sarra, ed, Corporate Governance in Global Capital Markets 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003) 41 at 42. See e.g. Eric A Posner, “Law, Economics, and Ineffi cient 
Norms” (1996) 144:5 U Pa L Rev 1697; Melvin A Eisenberg, “Corporate Law and Social Norms” 
(1999) 99:5 Colum L Rev 1253 (for more on norms analysis).
23 Notable scholarly works are included in these footnotes. Enron’s collapse has also been retold in 
non-fi ction books and movies. See e.g. Bethany McLean & Peter Elkind, The Smartest Guys in the Room: 
The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron (New York: Portfolio, 2004); Mimi Swartz with Sherron 
Watkins, Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron (New York: Doubleday, 2003); Enron: 
The Smartest Guys in the Room, DVD: (New York: Magnolia Pictures, 2005); Frontline: Bigger Than Enron, 
2002, DVD (Boston, MA: WGBH, 2009).
24 See e.g. Douglas M Branson, “Enron—When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or Roadmap to 
Corporate Governance Reform?” (2003) 48:4 Vill L Rev 989 at 997-1002 [Branson, “Systems Fail”] 
(for a helpful summary).
25 See e.g. Kevin Anderson, “The Enron Outrage Game,” BBC News (26 February 2002), online: BBC 
News <http://www.bbc.com>. 
26 Other companies included Tyco International, Adelphia Communications, Peregrine Systems and 
Global Crossing.
27 See Luisa Beltran, “WorldCom Files Largest Bankruptcy Ever,” CNN Money (22 July 2002), online: 
CNN Money <http://www.money.cnn.com> (which reports WorldCom’s bankruptcy as the 
largest in the history of the United States with $107 billion in assets, dwarfi ng that of Enron, which 
listed $63.4 billion in assets when it fi led for bankruptcy). At the time of writing, the WorldCom 
bankruptcy is the third largest in history, after the bankruptcies of Lehman Brothers Holdings 
($639 billion) and Washington Mutual ($328 billion). See also Research Center: Largest All-Time 
Bankruptcies, 20 Largest Public Company Bankruptcy Filings 1980–Present, online: BankruptcyData.com, 
<http://www.bankruptcydata.com>.
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to management falsely infl ating revenues and under reporting costs.28 Following 
Enron’s collapse, there came to be several discussions from legal scholars on the 
appropriate governmental response to the scandals. Simon Deakin and Suzanne 
Konzelmann’s short article entitled “Corporate Governance after Enron: An Age 
of Enlightenment?”29 identifi es three groups of opinion that developed after the 
scandals. The following analysis summarizes Deakin and Konzelmann’s fi ndings 
and signifi cantly builds upon them by highlighting some of the more persuasive 
voices from legal scholarship at the time, and categorizing them within Deakin and 
Konzelmann’s three groups.
The fi rst group believed that Enron’s collapse only confi rmed the existing 
model was working and “might actually be a reason to be more confi dent about 
corporate America.”30 Enron was an “aberration,” and an example of one bad 
board did not denote that all boards were ineffective governance mechanisms.31 
This group, echoing Adam Smith’s laissez-faire market principles, felt that “[m]arket 
sanctions, in the form of reputational damage to its senior managerial team and 
to its auditors…served as an effective disciplinary device.”32 William W. Bratton 
described this group as “supporters of deregulation” who found Enron’s collapse 
to be “an exemplar of free market success.”33 In this sense, “If Enron was a house of 
cards, it was free market actors who blew it down, with a free market administration 
keeping its hands off.”34 Once discovered by the public, the false infl ation of Enron’s 
stock price came to an end, and its value within the fi nancial markets quickly 
depreciated. Because of the swift market reactions to Enron’s exposed activities, 
proponents of this fi rst position believed there was little to be accomplished with 
wider reforms to the existing corporate model. Enron’s bankruptcy, then, was a 
“triumph of capitalism.”35
28 See Complaint (Securities Fraud), Securities and Exchange Commission v  Worldcom, Inc, No 17588 (SDNY 
2002), online: Securities and Exchange Commission <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/
complr17588.htm> (which claims that WorldCom disguised its operating performance by using 
undisclosed and improper accounting that overstated its income by approximately $3 billion in 2001 
and $797 million during the fi rst quarter of 2002).
29 Simon Deakin & Suzanne J Konzelmann, “Corporate Governance after Enron: An Age of Enlighten-
ment?” in John Armour & Joseph A McCahery, eds, After Enron: Improving Corporate Law and Modernising 
Securities Regulation in Europe and the US (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006) at 155.
30 “Another Scandal, Another Scare,” The Economist (27 June 2002), online: The Economist <http://
www.economist.com>. See also Deakin & Konzelmann, supra note 29 at 155.
31 See Branson, “Systems Fail,” supra note 24. See also Douglas M Branson, “Enron is an Aberration,” 
USA TODAY (1 March 2002) 9A. 
32 Deakin & Konzelmann, supra note 29 at 155.
33 William W Bratton, “Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value” (2002) 76:5 & 6 Tul L Rev 
1275 at 1281.
34 Ibid.
35 Robert L Borosage, “Enron Conservatives,” The Nation 274:4 (4 February 2002) 4, online: The 
Nation <http://www.thenation.com> (noting that then-Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill called 
Enron’s rise and fall a “triumph of capitalism” at 5).
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The second group acknowledged that both managerial and “gatekeeper”36 
failures had occurred, and pushed for reform specifi cally addressing the misdeeds 
of Enron’s executives and its lack of proper corporate monitoring. This group 
focused on tightening securities regulation and improving the functioning of the 
shareholder primacy model, without challenging or restructuring it. Governance 
failures were traced back to confl icts of interest on the part of board members 
and its auditors. Many pointed to the false comfort of an independent monitoring 
board. On paper, Enron had a board that was ideal in several respects; among other 
favourable qualities, the board was diverse, with only two of their 14 directors 
classifi ed as insiders.37 Corporate governance issues thus focused on maintaining 
suffi cient director independence and accountability, as well as a subtle shifting of 
powers from managers back to shareholders. Leading the charge was the Council of 
Institutional Investors (CII), an organization that in 2002 represented institutional 
investors holding approximately $2 trillion in pension assets. This group provided 
a detailed list of accounting and corporate governance reform recommendations 
“to prevent future Enrons.”38 
Many of the CII recommendations, along with other recommendations 
from the second group, eventually coalesced and led to the creation of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 200239 (SOX Act). The SOX Act was enacted directly in response to the 
scandals and implemented several new rules and regulations to curtail unwanted 
corporate behaviour. In particular, it contained provisions addressing director and 
managerial accountability through fi nancial disclosure, including the imposition 
of a duty to disclose “on a rapid and current basis such additional information 
concerning material changes in the fi nancial condition or operations of the issuer, 
in plain English …;”40 greater internal controls, such as stricter standards on the 
36 Gatekeepers are reputational intermediaries who provide verifi cation and certifi cation services to 
investors. The term “gatekeeper” is not simply an academic concept. See U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, 2000 SEC LEXIS 
1389 (Securities Act Release No 7870 on 30 June 2000), at 5, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov> 
(where the SEC noted, “[t]he federal … laws … make independent auditors ‘gatekeepers’ to the 
public securities markets”). 
37 Stuart L Gillan & John D Martin, “Financial Engineering, Corporate Governance, and the Collapse of 
Enron” (2002) [unpublished, archived at the Social Science Research Network] online: Social Science 
Research Network <http://ssrn.com>.
38 Council of Institutional Investors, Press Release, “SWIB Joins Council of Institutional Investors Seeking 
Reforms to Prevent Future Enrons” (4 February 2002), online: State of Wisconsin Investment Board 
<http://www.swib.state.wi.us>.  The SWIB’s recommendations, which were largely adopted by the 
SOX Act, infra note 39, were as follows: (1) “Reform auditor independence standards by prohi biting 
auditors from providing any non-audit services to their audit clients;” (2) “Radically reform the over-
sight of auditors;” (3) “Require enhanced disclosure of director links to companies;” (4) “Toughen the 
stock exchanges’ listing standards on board independence and board composition;” (5) “Do not soften 
the SEC’s stance on enforcement;” (6) “Restore integrity to the proxy voting system by eliminating 
the stock exchanges’‘broker may vote’ rule;” and (7) “Meaningfully update disclosure requirements 
for fi nancial and other critical information.”
39 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L No 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (2002) (codifi ed at 15 USC § 7201 
(2002)) [SOX Act].
40 Ibid, § 409 (1).
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certifi cation of annual and quarterly reports by top executives and a prohibition 
against share sales by corporate offi cers during pension blackouts;41 auditor inde-
pendence, such as rotating the auditor partner every fi ve years;42 as well as the 
addition of stricter criminal penalties for managers responsible for any violations.43
Deakin and Konzelmann called the perspective of the third group “a radi-
cally different explanation for Enron’s fall.”44 While this group generally accepted 
and approved of the initiatives created by the SOX Act, the underlying belief was 
that these reform efforts did not go far enough in addressing the root of the 
problem. Deakin and Konzelmann noted, “[f]rom this [third] perspective, the fate 
of Enron is less important than the future of the business model which it came to 
represent ….”45 The group also believed that “[u]nless the regulatory framework is 
adjusted to make this model unattractive, it will only be a matter of time before 
the same approach is tried again.”46 The problems of Enron inherently grew from 
principles embodied within the shareholder primacy model of the corporation. 
Members of the senior management of Enron were given stock options that 
motivated short-term stock appreciation, and their unethical practices exemplifi ed 
the “dark side” of the shareholder wealth maximization norm.47 Proponents of this 
third position felt that the model fostered an environment that created oversized 
incentives, which invited corruption. “[G]overnance standards… [had] declined, 
particularly those addressed to the numerology of shareholder value,”48 and the 
artifi cial infl ation of Enron’s stock was revealed only during the downward cycle of 
a cyclical economy. Clearly, some argued, a reliable corporate governance model 
should be designed to catch wrongdoing before it causes serious fi nancial damage 
to shareholders and other stakeholders; therefore, the multiple scandals in 2001 
and 2002 only demonstrated how the existing model did not work.49 Deakin and 
Konzelmann shared this stance, stating: 
We believe that this third interpretation of events goes to the heart 
of the matter…. If we are to take this view seriously, nothing less 
than a fundamental rethinking of corporate governance practices 
and procedures is required. Above all, corporate governance must 
no longer confi ne its analysis to the relationship between managers, 
41 Ibid, § 306(a).
42 Ibid, § 203. 
43 Ibid, § 802.
44 Deakin & Konzelmann, supra note 29 at 156. 
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 See Bratton, supra note 33 at 1284.
48 Ibid at 1284.
49 See e.g. Jeffrey N Gordon, “Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information 
Order of Sarbanes-Oxley” (2003) [unpublished, archived at Columbia Law School, Center for Law 
and Economic Studies]. 
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boards and shareholders. The narrowness of this focus is a major 
contributing factor to the present round of corporate scandals of 
which Enron is the most emblematic.50 
Other scholars, such as Sarra, identifi ed how the scandals signifi ed a real 
need to reassess other models of corporate governance available throughout the 
world. When examining governance issues within the global capital markets 
shortly following Enron’s bankruptcy, Sarra noted:
[T]he recent failures of large, publicly traded corporations in the 
United States cast doubt on claims of the ultimate superiority of 
the market-centred system. When this doubt is coupled with the 
existence of other forms of corporate governance throughout the 
world, the need for closer examination of potential alternatives or 
improvements in corporate governance becomes more evident.51
Still others, such as Cary Coglianese and Michael L. Michael, suggested that 
real corporate governance reform may only be found through the disentrenchment 
and reinvention of cultural norms, stating:
If corporate scandals stem from the same kind of underlying cultural 
problems that some insist affl ict politics, sports, and even religion, 
then the core challenge for public policy will be to fi nd ways to 
engender nothing less than a fundamental cultural shift.52
These voices aligned with scholars that had been supporting “counter-
hegemonic” discourses on the shareholder primacy model for some time.53 
However, voices from this third group supporting structural changes to the 
shareholder primacy model did not gain much traction on the pathway to reform 
after the scandals of 2001 and 2002. They were easily outnumbered by those leading 
the second group and the mainstream push for greater regulation of fi nancial 
50 Deakin & Konzelmann, supra note 29 at 156 
51 Janis Sarra, “Introduction” in Sarra, supra note 22 at xv.
52 Cary Coglianese & Michael L Michael, After the Scandals: Changing Relationships in Corporate Gover-
nance, Regulatory Policy Program Report RPP-09 (Cambridge, MA: Mossavar-Rahmani Center 
for Business and Government, Harvard University, 2006) at 20, online: Harvard Kennedy School 
<http://hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/papers/afterthescandals.pdf>.
53 See e.g. Kellye Y Testy, “Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social Movements” 
(2002) 76:4 Tul L Rev 1227 at 1232-40. Testy describes “hegemonic” discourse as discussions 
surrounding the shareholder primacy and wealth maximization model, where “managers’ highest 
duties are to shareholders and to maximizing their wealth; thus, shareholders must be preferred in 
the event that a confl ict between corporate constituents emerges” at 1231. Counter-hegemonic 
discourse thus seeks to describe alternative visions of corporate law.
199Corporate Governance Reform for the 21st Century: 
A Critical Reassessment of the Shareholder Primacy Model
reporting and auditing practices. The discussion during that period surrounded 
the effectiveness of the SOX Act and the alteration of the rules to curtail unwanted 
human behaviour within existing governance structures, rather than the possibility 
of revamping the dominant corporate form. 
C. Ascendancy of Behavioural Approaches
From a law and economics perspective, the scandals marked an interesting period. 
It is apparent from Posner’s later writings that he fi rmly belonged within the 
fi rst group of scholars supporting laissez-faire market principles, and not within 
the second group calling for stricter market regulations to support the existing 
governance model, nor the third group envisioning deep normative and structural 
reform. In Posner’s 2007 edition of the Economic Analysis of Law, where he directly 
responded to the corporate events of 2001 and 2002, he stated:
[F]raud has long been criminal, and the successful prosecution 
of the Enron executives suggests that adequate legal tools were in 
place to deal with such conduct before Sarbanes-Oxley…. As for 
the receipt by accounting fi rms of fees for consulting and accounting 
services…[i]t should be enough to require the corpo ration to 
disclose to investors the terms of its relations with its auditors, 
and leave the investors to penalize a corporation by bidding down 
its stock price if they think the auditor has been ‘bought.’54
Other advocates of the Chicago School generally echoed this sentiment. 
For example, Gary S. Becker, Nobel laureate and a prominent fi gure in the 
Chicago School, argued that if a fully deregulated energy market had been in 
place, “the Enron political scandal would have been largely avoided” since “[t]he 
company could not have gamed the system by encouraging politicians to deregulate 
as it favored.”55 While conceding that the scandal “indicate[d] the need for stricter 
guidelines on accounting and greater Internal Revenue Service,” Becker pointed out 
that “stock markets have responded by punishing Enron severely for the company’s 
transgressions…” and that “fl exible prices and competition are far more effective 
ways to improve energy markets than allowing bureaucrats and politicians to 
determine the speed and direction of deregulation.”56
Despite the fi rm stance by leading scholars in the Chicago School, this 
controversial period in corporate history provided opportunities for other strands 
within law and economics scholarship, particularly behavioural approaches, to 
54 Posner, Economic Analysis (7th ed), supra note 11 at 452. See generally ibid at 450-52.
55 Gary S Becker, “Enron Was Mostly Right About One Thing: Deregulation,” Business Week (18 March 
2002) 26, online: Business Week <http://www.businessweek.com>.
56 Ibid.
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broaden their audience. Objections to the depiction of human agents as rational 
actors within the fi eld of law and economics, and especially the Chicago School, 
had frequently been voiced in the past by both its supporters and its critics.57 The 
scandals exposed the overwhelming need for greater quantitative and qualitative 
research surrounding human behaviour in modern fi nance, while also providing a 
golden opportunity to apply behavioural approaches to pressing legal issues.58
Schools were eagerly adopting behavioural approaches in response to the 
Chicago School’s concept of the rational, self-interested actor. Herbert A. Simon’s 
notion of “bounded rationality,” being “behavior that is intendedly rational, but 
only limitedly so …,”59 and other approaches addressing limitations within human 
behaviour60 were increasing in infl uence.61 Robert Prentice, for example, noted how 
the scandals supported his continued attempts “to create more realistic policy 
pres criptions than have been derived from the Chicago School law and economics 
reasoning that has dominated the interdisciplinary approach to legal analysis 
….”62  As well, Donald Langevoort asserted that “[t]he ones with the explaining 
to do [following the Enron debacle] are the believers in market effi ciency ….”63 
He contended that “behavioral fi nance is somewhat better positioned to test the 
real world impact of bias in market prices than research in more opaque economic 
settings,”64 and went on to develop a constructive theory of behavioural securities 
regulation. It was clear that those pressing for more contextualized critiques to the 
mainstream Chicago School of law and economics now had the chance to capitalize 
on those corporate events. 
57 See Mercuro & Medema, supra note 12 at 102-4. See also Christine Jolls, Cass R Sunstein & Richard 
Thaler, “A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics” (1998) 50:5 Stan L Rev 1471 (which noted 
that “[o]bjections to the rational actor model in law and economics are almost as old as the fi eld itself ” 
at 1473).
58 The fi eld was undergoing a transformative period toward the wider acceptance of approaches exten-
ding beyond neoclassical economics, including offshoots that developed from the work of the Chicago 
School. See e.g. Mercuro & Medema, supra note 12 at 284-90 (which discusses, for example, Guido 
Calabresi’s infl uence within what the authors call the New Haven School of law and economics). 
59 Herbert A Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Process in Administrative Organi-
zation, 2d ed (New York: Macmillan, 1957) at xxiv [Simon, Administrative Behavior] [emphasis in the 
original]. See also Herbert A Simon, Models of Man: Social and Rational, Mathematical Essays on Rational 
Human Behavior in a Social Setting (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957) [Simon, Models of Man].
60 See e.g. Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 57.
61 This is not to say behavioural law and economics approaches were not already developing prior 
to the scandals of 2001 and 2002, but rather, that the corporate and accounting scandals allowed 
them to take centre stage. There have been disagreements as to when and how behavioural eco-
nomics began. See e.g. Hamid Hosseini, “The Arrival of Behavioral Economics: from Michigan or 
the Carnegie School in the 1950s and the Early 1960s?” (2003) 32:4 The Journal of Socio-
Economics at 391. But see Louis Uchitelle, “Following the Money, but Also the Mind: Some Econo-
mists Call Behaviour a Key,” The New York Times (11 February 2001), online: The New York Times 
<http://www.nytimes.com>.
62 Robert Prentice, “Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy” (2003) 40:2 Am Bus LJ 417 at 419-20.
63 Donald C Langevoort, “Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioural Approach to 
Securities Regulation” in Armour & McCaherty, supra note 29 at 66.
64 Ibid at 67.
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Law and economics scholars that were adopting behavioural approaches 
around the time of the Enron scandal held, if anything, beliefs in line with the 
second group, which argued for greater transparency and accountability of directors 
and managers, and for stricter regulation following the scandals to support the 
shareholder primacy model. The work of behavioural law and economics scholars 
generally focused on ways in which the law could promote desired human behaviour 
within pre-existing structures. The fi eld itself utilizes traditional economic tools 
and enhances them by providing a better understanding of human behaviour in a 
market-driven environment. While recognizing that there can be new and innovative 
prescriptions from these lines of inquiry, following the scandals, behavioural law 
and economics scholars tended to focus on economic improvements within the 
boundaries of securities regulation and on “prescriptions regarding how to make the 
legal system work better;”65 not on challenging the very structures and institutions 
in which the law operated.66 Behavioural law and economics served as a useful tool 
to expose the fl aws within the existing model, but the approach was incapable of 
offering a meaningful alternative. 
Nevertheless, the growing trend towards of behavioural approaches 
signaled a marked change in law and economics analysis. In a 1998 article, 
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein and Richard Thaler noted, “Thirty years from 
now we hope that there will be no such thing as behavioral economics. Instead 
we hope that economists and economically oriented lawyers will … transform 
economics into behavioral economics, and economic analysis of law into one of 
its most important branches.”67  Following the scandals, the study of behavioural 
effects on economics garnered greater strength and momentum from these 
market-immobilizing events. George A. Akerlof, for example, argued in his 
Nobel Lecture on December 8, 2001, two months after news of the Enron 
scandal broke, that macroeconomics should be behavioural and that John Maynard 
Keynes’ General Theory “was the progenitor of the modern behavioral fi nance view 
of asset markets.”68 The following year, the selection of Daniel Kahneman as the 
co-recipient of the 2002 Nobel Prize in economic sciences indicated to many 
“the ascendancy of behavioral economics.”69
One would think the corporate and accounting scandals of 2001 and 2002 
would leave an indelible mark against Hansmann and Kraakman’s claim that the 
shareholder primacy model was the fi nal resting place of the corporate form. 
65 Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 57 at 1546.
66 See e.g. Prentice, supra note 62; Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 57.
67 Ibid at 1547.
68 George A Akerlof, “Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior” in Peter Englund, 
ed, Nobel Lectures Including Presentation Speeches and Laureates’ Biographies: Economic Sciences 2001-2005 
(New Jersey: World Scientifi c, 2005) 19 at 37, online: Nobel Prize <http://nobelprize.org>.
69 Peter H Huang, “Regulating Irrational Exuberance and Anxiety in Securities Markets” in Francesco 
Parisi & Vernon L Smith, eds, The Law and Economics of Irrational Behaviour (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2005) 501 at 502.
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Hansmann himself noted fi ve years after his article with Kraakman that “[t]he most 
serious argument against the effi ciency claim…is that the standard shareholder-
oriented model involves too steep a tradeoff between material prosperity and social 
order…. It is from this perspective that the end of history claim is weakest.”70 It 
was apparent from the scandals that the human limitations of “bounded rationality, 
bounded will-power, and bounded self-interest”71 exposed the inherent fl aws found 
within perceived transparencies and effi ciencies in the fi nancial market. Following 
those events, many felt a behavioural approach to law and economics offered a 
better way of addressing human weaknesses in regulatory design, but the approach 
contained few positive prescriptions for the development of an alternative, 
competing model. The burden continued to rest on lawmakers’ abilities to 
adequately protect stakeholder interests through contractual or regulatory means, 
and not on the corporate governance model itself. The scandals were potentially 
damaging to the reputation of the shareholder primacy model, but its continued 
survival only solidifi ed Hansmann and Kraakman’s argument that the model had 
lasting acceptance within US ideological thought. 
III. NARRATIVES FROM THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
A. Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act72
The Banking Act of 1933,73 popularly known as the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA), had 
restricted commercial banks from any involvement in the securities industry, 
creating a fi rewall between commercial banking and investment banking. On 
November 12, 1999, then-US President Bill Clinton signed into law the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act74 (GLBA), which repealed some of the key elements of the GSA so that 
banks could thereafter be affi liated with securities fi rms. 
Then-US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers described the repeal 
of the GSA as “updat[ing] the rules that have governed fi nancial services since 
the Great Depression and replac[ing] them with a system for the 21st century,” 
thereby allowing American banks to “grow larger and better compete on the world 
stage.”75  Senator Phil Gramm, the chief sponsor of the GLBA, identifi ed the GSA as a 
70 Henry Hansmann, “How Close is the End of History?” (2006) 31:3 J Corp L 745 at 747-48. 
71 Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 57 at 1476. See also Simon, Administrative Behavior, supra note 59 
at xxiv-xxvii; Simon, Models of Man, supra note 59 at 196-206. 
72 See Cristie Ford and Carol Liao, “Power Without Property, Still: Unger, Berle and the Derivatives 
Revolution” (2010) 33:4 Seattle UL Rev 889 at 919, n 123, 927-28, nn 153-54 (for an earlier account 
of the repeal of the GSA).     
73 GSA, supra note 1.
74 Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub L No 106-102, 113 Stat 1338 (codifi ed as amended 
in scattered sections of 15 USC) (commonly known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act).
75 Cyrus Sanati, “10  Years Later, Looking at Repeal of Glass-Steagall,”  The New York Times (12 November 
2009), online: The New York Times Deal Book <http://www.nytimes.com>.
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“puni tive” law that was brought about by fear and popular “demagoguery” from the 
Great Depression, and which “forced an artifi cial separation of the fi nancial sector 
of our economy.”76 Other senators also argued that the GSA created “unnecessary 
barriers”77 in the economy, and applauded its demise.78 
Looking back, the GSA had already been considerably weakened by incre-
mental bank incursions over the line of separation through the 1990s. However, what 
is less widely known is how one of the largest pending mergers79 of its time, between 
two fi nancial giants, Citicorp Inc. (Citicorp) and Travelers Group Inc. (Travelers), 
ultimately dealt the fi nal blow to the Act. The deal between these corporations created 
the largest “fi nancial supermarket” in the world, “giving [both institutions] access 
to an expanded client base”80—particularly with Travelers promoting its mutual 
funds and insurance to Citicorp’s retail customers. The pending $70 billion merger 
(totalling over $698 billion in assets)81 to form Citigroup Inc. (Citigroup) was 
in violation of certain provisions of the GSA as well as the Bank Holding Company Act 
of 195682 because of its resulting combination as a fi nancial services company offering 
commercial banking and investment operations. All involved were aware the merger 
violated the law, but the potential fi nancial gains were enough for powerful business 
executives to go out of their way and lobby politicians to ensure future law would 
support it.83
While it is true that the Citicorp-Travelers merger legally closed following 
the implementation of the GLBA, it had already been agreed to well in advance 
of the introduction of that legislation. When Citicorp and Travelers announced the 
signing of their merger on April 6, 1998, Sanford Weill of  Travelers, in response 
to questions regarding the legal hurdles before the two corporations, stated, “We 
are hopeful that over that time the legislation will change…. We have had enough 
discussions [with the Federal Reserve Board] to believe this will not be a problem.”84 
In the end, the executives of the future Citigroup “basically drafted the [legislation] 
76 US, Cong Rec, vol 145, 20, at S28360 (4 Nov 1999) (Senator Gramm). 
77 Ibid at S28354 (Senator Wyden).
78 See ibid at S28322-23 and S28355 (for statements by Senator Lieberman and Senator Hagel).
79 See Mitchell Martin, “Citicorp and Travelers Plan to Merge in Record $70 Billion Deal: A New 




82 12 USC § 1841 (United States Government Printing Offi ce Supp 1992).
83 The Senate Banking Committee had approved the initial draft of the GLBA on March 4, 1999, almost 
a year after the parties announced their deal to the media, and fi ve months after the companies 
had effectively merged. See Senate Banking Committee, Press Release, “Time Line of Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act,” online: United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs 
<http://banking.senate.gov/prel99/1105tme.htm>; Citigroup Inc, 200 Years Citi, online: Citigroup 
<http://www.citigroup.com/citi/press/mobile/ir/html/timeline/index-com.html> [Citigroup] 
(which provides relevant dates in the 1992 timeline under “Capital markets after the merger” and 
“Momentous encounter leads to merger”).
84 Martin, supra note 79.
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that would govern its behavior.”85 Kenneth H. Thomas, a consultant and lecturer 
in fi nance at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, noted that 
“Citigroup is not the result of [the GLBA] but the cause of it.”86 Weill had forced the 
repeal issue of the GSA. In his induction into the Academy of Achievement, Weill’s 
biography outlines the strategic manoeuvres that came with changing the law: 
Weill and Citicorp Chairman John S. Reed decided to force the 
issue [of repeal]. They went ahead with their plan and secured a 
waiver whereby the temporary merger of the companies would be 
permitted, pending congressional action. Weill recruited former 
President Gerald Ford, a Republican, and former Treasury Secretary 
Robert Rubin, a Democrat, to serve on the board of the merged 
companies and assist them in making their case to Congress.87
The timing by which Robert Rubin entered the picture is of particular 
interest. Rubin was still US Treasury Secretary at the signing of the merger, serving 
in that capacity from 1995 to 1999.88 As Treasury Secretary, he played a large role 
in brokering the passage of the fi nal draft of the GLBA, which allowed Citicorp and 
Travelers to legally merge. Following Senate approval of the bill on May 6, 1999, 
Rubin resigned as Treasury Secretary. Five months later, he became the Chairman 
of the Board at the newly formed Citigroup.89 While recognizing that it was Rubin’s 
expertise which made him a contender in a very small group of people who were 
under serious consideration to take on these government and private sector roles, 
the example is an exposing one. It is erroneous to believe that political actions 
are necessarily separated from corporate infl uence and powerful lobbying efforts, 
or that regulators and corporate actors at elite levels are distinctly separate. The 
United States Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 
which eliminated the ban on corporate political spending, could magnify this point 
in the future.90 
85 Chris Suellentrop, “Sandy Weill: How Citigroup’s CEO Rewrote the Rules So He Could Live Richly,” 
The Slate (20 November 2002), online: Slate.com <http://www.slate.com>.
86 Kenneth H Thomas, “Don’t Underestimate the Power of Sandy Weill,” Letter to the Editor, 
Businessweek (30 September 2002), online: Businessweek.com <http://www.businessweek.com> 
(comments that previous Businessweek articles on the Citibank-Travelers merger do not explain how 
Citibank essentially caused the GLBA to exist).
87 Academy of Achievement, “Sanford Weill Biography: Financier and Philanthropist,” online: Aca-
demy of Achievement <http://www.achievement.org>. Interestingly, Weill recanted his position 
13 years later. See Michael J De La Merced, “Weill Calls for Splitting up Big Banks”  The New  York Times 
(25 July 2012), online: The New York Times Dealbook <http://www.nytimes.com>. 
88 US Department of the Treasury, “Robert E Rubin (1995-1999),” online: US Department of the Trea-
sury <http://www.treasury.gov>.
89 Citigroup, supra note 83.
90 130A S Ct 876 (2010). See also Adam Liptak, “Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate Campaign Spending 
Limit: Dissenters Argue that Ruling Will Corrupt Democracy,” The New York Times (22 January 2010) 
A1, online: The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com>.
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An extensive consolidation in banking occurred following the repeal of the 
GSA by the GLBA. Between 1990 and 2005, more than 5,400 mergers occurred 
in the US banking industry, involving more than $5.0 trillion in banking assets.91 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. noted that “US and European banks took advantage of the 
progressive dismantling of the [GSA] by acquiring dozens of US securities fi rms … 
and large securities fi rms [in turn] made their own acquisitions.92 The bank merger 
wave meant that the proportion of banking assets held by the 10 largest US banks 
more than doubled, from 25 percent in 1990 to 55 percent in 2005. Wall Street 
fi rms also secured bank-like powers by acquiring depository institutions insured 
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), enabling them to offer 
FDIC-insured deposits and to make commercial and consumer loans.93 By 2006, 
the four largest US securities fi rms—Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Goldman 
Sachs and Lehman Brothers—had effectively become “de facto universal banks” or 
shadow banks.94 
Many have noted that the problematic mix of the two banking sectors 
was self-evident. Andrew Sheng, for example, stated “you cannot mix the 
culture of investment banking (where risk taking is key) and commercial 
banking (where prudence is vital) under one roof.”95 The repeal of regulatory 
fi rewalls under the GSA invited “massive contagion” between banking industry 
sectors.96 Martin Wolf of the Financial Times observed “that fi nancial liberalisation 
and fi nancial crises go together like a horse and carriage.”97 Several experts have 
pointed to the shadow banking system as the “core of what happened” to cause 
91 Arthur E Wilmarth, Jr, “The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the 
Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis” (2009) 41 Conn L Rev 963 at 977.
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid at 977-8.
94 Ibid at 978.
95 Andrew Sheng, From Asian to Global Financial Crisis: An Asian Regulator’s View of Unfettered Finance in the 
1990s and 2000s (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 401.
96 Ibid at 326.
97 Martin Wolf, “This time will never be different,” Financial Times (28 September 2009), online: 
Financial Times <http://www.ft.com>. On December 16, 2009, Senators John McCain and 
Maria Cantwell proposed legislation to Congress reinstating the GSA or a form of it, under 
which large banks “would be forced to return to the business of conventional banking, lea-
ving the task of risktaking or management to others.” Alison Vekshin, “U.S. Senators Pro-
pose Reinstating Glass-Steagall Act,” Bloomberg (16 December 2009), online: Bloomberg.com 
<http://www.bloomberg.com>. The proposal sparked a renewed debate on whether the repeal 
of the GSA led to the current financial crisis. Regardless of one’s stance, reactions on the feasi-
bility of the proposal have been mixed, with some very strong dissents. These dissents reflect 
the loaded question of how practical a reconstruction of former legal structures would be once 
property has been allowed to disperse and co-mingle to such an extent. The proposed legis lation 
has not moved forward. See ibid; Alison Vekshin & James Sterngold, “Reviving Glass-Steagall 
Means Escalating ‘War’ on Wall Street,” Businessweek (27 December 2009), online: Business-
week.com <http://www.businessweek.com>; Michael Hirsh, “An Odd Post-Crash Couple,” 
Newsweek (14 December 2009), online: The Daily Beast.com <http://www.thedailybeast.com/
newsweek>. 
206 REVUE DE DROIT D’OTTAWA OTTAWA LAW REVIEW
43:2 43:2
the crisis.98  The questionable relationship between Citigroup management and its 
regulators in the repeal of the GSA is only one of a multitude of factors leading up 
to the global fi nancial crisis, but it is a telling one. The reliance of regulation to 
protect stakeholder interests under the shareholder primacy model is problematic, 
and ignores the realities of disinterested owners (who through computerized 
markets are able to own and then sell shares in fractions of a minute, among other 
things), the growing phenomenon of shareholder decisions being manipulated by 
vote buying through equity derivatives,99 the singularly-focused and well-connected 
executives, as well as the regulators whose actions do not show a meaningful regard 
for broader stakeholder interests. 
B. Originate-to-Distribute Model of Lending100 and Repeal of Anti-Predatory 
Lending Legislation
The failure to protect broader stakeholder interests through regulation, a key tenet 
within Hansmann and Kraakman’s defi nition of the shareholder primacy model, 
is further evidenced when examining the backstory behind the development 
of the originate-to-distribute model of lending (OTDM). An unregulated, over-
the-counter (OTC) derivatives market permitted many corporate institutions to 
capitalize on inventive methods of generating income—and capitalize they did. The 
OTDM allowed fi nancial institutions to reduce their capital charges and transfer 
the risks associated with securitized loans to a market hungry to buy them. The 
strategy worked as follows: (i) originate consumer mortgage loans; (ii) package 
the loans, in tranches, into mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs); (iii) create additional OTC derivatives whose values are 
derived from the underlying loans; and (iv) distribute the repackaged securities to 
investors.101 Most institutions only held onto mortgages long enough to sell them 
to investors, which promoted a higher-risk environment for loan production. 
In addition to creating a separation between the mortgagor-mortgagee 
relationship and its accompanying mortgage risks, originating fi nancial institutions 
98 See e.g. Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 (New York: WW 
Norton & Company, 2009) at 163. See also Wilmarth, Jr, supra note 91; Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission, supra note 2 at 27-37; Katrina Brooker, “Citi’s Creator, Alone with His Regrets,” 
The New York Times (3 January 2010) BU1. But see Peter J Wallison, “Did the ‘Repeal’ of Glass-Steagall 
Have Any Role in the Financial Crisis? Not Guilty. Not Even Close,” Policy Brief (2009-PB-07), 
Networks Financial Institute at Indiana State University, online: Networks Financial Institute 
<http://www.networksfi nancialinstitute.org>. 
99 Henry TC Hu and Bernard Black have outlined the negative potential effects that arise from so-called 
“empty voting” and “hidden (morphable) ownership,” where derivatives have allowed investors to 
readily separate economic ownership of shares from voting rights. Hu & Black have produced a series 
of articles on the matter. For their inaugural landmark piece, see Henry TC Hu & Bernard Black, “The 
New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership” (2006) 79 S Cal L Rev 811. 
100 The fi rst two paragraphs in this section describing the originate-to-distribute model of lending are 
derived from a longer account that appeared in Ford & Liao, supra note 72 at 903-6. 
101 See Wilmarth, Jr, supra note 91 at 981.
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sold mortgages immediately to investors and were therefore able to replenish 
their funds and issue more loans to generate greater transaction fees. The fi nancial 
incentive was so great that it motivated corporations to (i) originate risky loans 
without screening borrowers and (ii) avoid post-loan monitoring of the mortgagees’ 
behaviour because the loans were transferred to investors.102 A potential mortgagee 
was previously required to provide documentary evidence of adequate income 
and assets to support the repayment of the loan. With time, however, the fi erce 
competition between lending institutions lessened the requirements to a point 
where “No Income, No Asset” (NINA) mortgages were created. In these NINA 
mortgages, a potential mortgage borrower would not be required to provide any 
evidence of their income or assets to qualify for a loan. Of course, this development 
also meant that no information would be verifi ed by the mortgage lender. As put 
by one former executive director at the mortgage trading desk of Morgan Stanley, 
“We’re setting you up to lie. Something about that transaction feels very wrong …
Unfortunately what happened, we did it because everybody else was doing it.”103
How did the mortgage lending industry get to this point? A well-functioning 
shareholder primacy model recognizes that stakeholder interests are exclusively 
within the purview of the government, and stakeholder protection must be sought 
through contractual or regulatory means. Why were no stiff anti-predatory lending 
laws in place to, at the very least, curtail some of the worst corporate behaviours 
being exhibited by the industry? The easy answer would be to blame state and federal 
legislators for failing to govern effectively. However, powerful lobbying efforts by 
corporate institutions, just like those discussed in the preceding narrative, played a 
critical role in infl uencing regulatory inaction. These lobbying efforts prevented the 
implementation of regulations that could have contained reckless lending practices. 
More troubling, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) paper has provided empirical 
evidence supporting the correlation between lobbying activities by corporate and fi nan-
cial institutions on issues related to mortgage lending and securitization, and signifi -
cantly riskier mortgage lending strategies by those institutions leading up to the crisis.104 
Several subprime lenders and banking trade groups, particularly 
Ameriquest Mortgage Company (Ameriquest) but also “Citigroup Inc., Wells 
Fargo & Co., Countrywide Financial Corp. and the Mortgage Bankers Asso -
ciation, spent heavily on lobbying and political giving [such as donations and 
campaign contributions]… to defeat anti-predatory lending legislation”105 in the 
102 Ibid at 974. 
103 Alex Blumberg, “355: The Giant Pool of Money Transcript” (5 May 2008) Interview of Mike Francis on 
This American Life, Chicago Public Radio Archives at 11, online: This American Life <http://www.
thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/355/transcript>. 
104 Prachi Mishra, Deniz Igan & Thierry Tressel, A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis, 
Working Paper No 09/287 (Washington, DC: IMF Publications, 2009), online: International 
Monetary Fund <http://www.imf.org>.
105 Glenn R Simpson, “Lender Lobbying Blitz Abetted Mortgage Mess,” The Wall Street Journal (31 De-
cember 2007) B1.
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run-up to the crisis. From 2002 through 2006, Ameriquest and its affi liates 
donated at least $20.5 million to state and federal political groups.106 Hiring 
lobbyist Lisa Andrews as Senior Executive for Government Affairs at Ameriquest 
meant the company gained access to several lobbying fi rms dedicated to infl uencing 
legislation. During her tenure at Ameriquest, Andrews noted that, at her separately 
owned Washington public relations fi rm, Washington Communications Group Inc., 
she had “built a coalition of mortgage brokers, mortgage bankers, appraisers, title 
companies, and others involved in home mortgage lending to create a grass-roots 
lobbying campaign that produced 7,000 emails and faxes to state policymakers in a 
six-week time frame.”107 Andrews’ husband, Wright Andrews, and his governmental 
relations fi rm Butera & Andrews, “collected at least $4 million in fees from the 
subprime industry from 2002 through 2006….”108 These efforts to infl uence the 
state laws that governed the industry worked tremendously well. For example, 
consider how industry lobbying efforts infl uenced Georgia’s anti-predatory 
legislation. On April 22, 2002, Georgia signed into law the Georgia Fair Lending Act 
(GFLA) which became effective on October 1, 2002.109 Among other things, the 
GFLA required lenders to be able to prove that a refi nancing of any home loan 
less than fi ve years old would provide a “tangible net benefi t to the borrower.”110 
Ameriquest began lobbying the state legislature to remove this provision, 
arguing the standard was too vague.111 The company began contributing to Georgia 
106 Ibid. See also Paul Muolo & Mathew Padilla, Chain of Blame: How Wall Street Caused the Mortgage 
and Credit Crisis (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons Inc, 2008) at 91-93 (which details the lobbying 
efforts of Ameriquest and the Arnall family). Ameriquest founder Roland Arnall and his wife 
contributed more than $5.0 million to political organizations that backed then-US President 
George W Bush. See Simpson, supra note 105. On August 1, 2005, then-President Bush offi cially 
appointed Roland Arnall ambassador to the Netherlands (approved by the Senate on February 9, 
2006). See Kirstin Downey, “Bush Picks Ameriquest Owner as Ambassador,” The Washington Post 
(29 July 2005), online: The Washington Post <http://www.washingtonpost.com> (for a report 
on the press release and the ensuing negative public reactions); “Bush Nominates Arnall as Hague 
Ambassador,” Expatica News (1 August 2005), online: Expatica <http://www.expatica.com/nl/
main.html>.
107 Simpson, supra note 105. Washington Communications Group no longer has a website.
108 Ibid. Wright Andrews was also involved in “three different subprime-industry trade groups: the 
National Home Equity Mortgage Association, of which Ameriquest was a member; the Coalition for 
Fair and Affordable Lending, which spent $6.3 million lobbying against state laws before it dissolved 
[in early 2007] …; and the Responsible Mortgage Lending Coalition.”
109 OCGA tit 7 § 7-6A (2007) [GFLA]. See also Department of Banking and Finance, “Georgia Fair Lending 
Act Resources,” online: Department of Banking and Finance <http://www.dbf.georgia.gov>. 
A helpful summary of the terms of the original GFLA can be found on the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta website, see “Georgia’s Anti-Predatory Lending Law,” online: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 
<http://www.frbatlanta.org>.
110 GFLA, supra note 109, § 7-6A-4(a).
111 See Muolo & Padilla, supra note 106 at 91-93; Simpson, supra note 105. A white paper produced by 
the Georgia Credit Union Affi liates, the Community Bankers Association of Georgia and the Georgia 
Bankers Association outlines some of the concerns held by those who opposed the new legislation 
at the time. See “Georgia Fair Lending Act: The Unintended Consequences” (January 2003), online: 
Georgia Bankers Association <http://www.gabankers.com>.
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112 See e.g. Simpson, supra note 105 (which reports that according to records of the Georgia State Ethics 
Commission in December 2001, Ameriquest “donated $2,500 to Lt. Gov. Mark Taylor after he 
emerged as an infl uential fi gure in the debate …, [and then] with another $2,500 in September 
2002”) [these records are no longer available via the Internet as they are over fi ve years old].
113 Ibid. Records of any such announcement are no longer available online. 
114 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, supra note 109.  The original announcements are no longer available 
on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s websites.
115 Ibid.
116 See “S&P Comments on Georgia Fair Lending Act Announcement” Business Wire (24 January 2003), 
online: Business Library <http://fi ndarticles.com> [“S&P Comments”]; Mortgage Bankers Asso-
ciation, News Release, “Fitch Ratings Declines to Rate Georgia Loans in RMBS Pools Considers 
Impact to Other Predatory Lending Legislation” (12 October 2005), online: Press Center <http://
www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/32158.htm>.
117 “S&P Comments,” supra note 116.
118 Simpson, supra note 105.
119 The State Senate voted 29-26 in favour of amendments; the State House of Representatives passed 
the law, 148-25. See Mortgage Banking Association Business Alert,“Georgia Passes Fair Lending Act 
Amendments” (1 April 2003), online: All Business <http://www.allbusiness.com> (which reports 
that “[t]he bill clarifi es ambiguities in the GFLA and repeals provisions that had caused many mortgage 
lenders to cease lending activities in Georgia since the GFLA became effective in October 2002”).
For a timeline of the GFLA, see Community Investment Network, “Georgia Predatory Lending Laws 
Legislative History,” online: <http://www.communityinvestmentnetwork.org/index.php?id=1684>.
politicians112 and the subprime industry mounted a campaign against the rule in 
the GFLA. 
In October 2002, Ameriquest announced it would stop doing business in 
Georgia until the law changed.113 Other lenders also complained about the law, 
as did the Federal National Mortgage Association (commonly known as “Fannie 
Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (commonly known 
as “Freddie Mac”). Both “announced plans to leave the ‘high-cost loan’ market in 
Georgia,” with Freddie Mac declaring that it would stop purchasing those loans as of 
November 2002 and Fannie Mae as of January 2003.114 Fannie Mae also announced 
that it would “conduct additional quality assurance reviews of mortgages secured 
by properties in Georgia and [would] require ‘immediate’ repurchase of those loans 
determined to be high-cost home loans under the GFLA, or other federal, state or 
local laws.”115 Shortly there after, Standard & Poor Corp. (S&P) and Fitch Ratings 
(Fitch) announced they would no longer assign credit ratings to many mortgage 
securities containing subprime loans from Georgia.116 Both S&P and Fitch believed 
that if loans were found to be in violation of the law, the legal risk could carry the 
investors, potentially tainting the securities. S&P contended that under the new 
law, “liability for predatory lending practices does not stop with the lender guilty 
of the predatory practices but transfers to all purchasers of the mortgage, including 
purchasers who had no knowledge or role in the predatory lending.”117 Without 
credit ratings, such securities would have been virtually unmarketable. The change 
raised the possibility that subprime lenders would simply stop making loans in 
Georgia. Within months, the Georgia state government passed new amendments 
that eliminated the “tangible net benefi t”118 requirement opposed by the industry 
for nearly all loans.119 The same scenario began to play out in other states, including 
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New Jersey, Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania and Texas, whose anti-predatory 
lending laws were also rolled back.120 This again is a marked example of how the 
shareholder primacy model provides an incomplete story of how non-shareholder 
stakeholders can be adequately protected through regulation. 
The mass production of subprime mortgage loans by the mortgage lending 
industry allowed for the derivative producing machine of the OTDM to operate on 
overdrive. Cristie Ford and I have noted that “[b]y 2006, the U.S. housing market 
was resting on what some called a system of ‘Ponzi fi nance’ in which subprime 
borrowers kept taking out new loans from equity on their homes to pay off 
their existing mortgages on those same homes.”121 In January 2006, Ameriquest 
announced a $325 million settlement with state attorneys general, law enforcement 
agencies and fi nancial regulators across the US over allegations of predatory lending 
practices used to encourage homeowners to refi nance mortgages. These allegations 
“included misrepresenting and failing to disclose loan terms, charging excessive loan 
origination fees, and infl ating appraisals to qualify borrowers for loans.”122 The 
settlement covered approximately 725,000 loans valued at more than $109 billion 
that were made by Ameriquest from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2005.123 
In May 2006, Ameriquest announced that it was closing all of its retail offi ces. 
In September 2007, all of its mortgage assets were sold to Citigroup.124
Ameriquest’s eventual fall may support the belief that market regulation 
again suffi ced. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Ameriquest is only one example 
that researchers can point to in hindsight—it is impossible to guess how many 
similar actions from corporations have gone unprosecuted to date. Furthermore, 
Ameriquest’s demise does not change how lobbying efforts rolled back anti-
predatory lending laws intended to protect mortgage borrowers. Housing prices 
began to decline in mid-2006, and borrowers who bought more real estate than they 
120 See Muolo & Padilla, supra note 106 at 92; Simpson, supra note 105. The Mortgage Bankers Asso-
ciation website also lists a signifi cant number of news releases issued from groups in the mortgage 
lending industry that lobbied against anti-predatory lending laws in several states, online: Mortgage 
Bankers Association <http://www.mortgagebankers.org>.
121 Ford & Liao, supra note 72 at 905.
122 New York State Offi ce of the Attorney General, Press Release, “Governor Spitzer and Attorney 
General Cuomo Announce More Than 13,000 New Yorkers to Receive Settlements in Preda-
tory Lending Case” (24 December 2007), online: New York State Offi ce of the Attorney General
<http://www.oag.state.ny.us>. 
123 State of New York Banking Department, Press Release,“Banking Department Joins Regulators and 
Law Enforcement Offi cials from 48 Other States in Announcing Settlement Agreement with Ame-
riquest Mortgage Company” (23 January 2006), online: State of New York Banking Department 
<http://www.banking.state.ny.us/pr060123.htm>. In 2005, Ameriquest’s employees also accused 
the company in the press. See Mike Hudson & E Scott Reckard, “Workers Say Lender Ran ‘Boiler 
Rooms,” Los Angeles Times (4 February 2005), online: Los Angeles Times <http://www.latimes.com> 
(where the authors indicate that critics stated the company “fabricated data, forged documents and 
hid fees,” among other things).
124 Jonathan Stempel, “Ameriquest Closes, Citigroup Buys Mortgage Assets,” Reuters (1 September 2007), 
online: Reuters <http://www.reuters.com>. See generally Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 
supra note 2.
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could afford could not refi nance and began defaulting on their loans.The increase 
in mort gage defaults and housing foreclosures translated into a sharp decline in the 
value of MBSs, CDOs and other bundled securities, and the subprime mortgage 
meltdown began. 
There have been varied interpretations of how the collapse of the subprime 
mortgage market transformed into the broader fi nancial crisis.125 The generally 
accepted interpretation of events can briefl y be described as follows. In the midst 
of the collapse, it was revealed that “too big to fail” institutions had engaged in a 
multitude of credit default swaps on those aforementioned MBSs, CDOs and other 
bundled securities. These securities were intended to insure investors against what 
these institutions believed to be the almost impossible event of default.126 By some 
estimates, the collective exposure of institutional investors in mid-2007 exceeded 
even that of banks.127 As the crisis continued to unfold, institutional investors in 
need of cash began to face a serious liquidity problem, but could not sell the asset-
backed securities in their portfolios due to low liquidity levels in the market.128 
As a result, they turned to their more liquid holdings of corporate bonds. However, 
as Rob Goldsmith noted: 
[W]ith several mutual funds and other institutional bond investors 
also trying to liquidate their corporate bond holdings, the market 
for these, too, was fl ooded and so prices plunged. As a result, the 
cost to companies of obtaining fi nancing by issuing corporate bonds 
increased. And, as a result of that, their ability to fi nance their 
operations was crippled, thus spreading the fi nancial crisis to the 
real economy.129 
At this juncture, it is worth noting an alternative explanation put forth 
by Gary B. Gorton on how the subprime mortgage collapse spun into the global 
fi nancial crisis. First, Gorton argues that, despite popular belief, the originate-to-
distribute model of lending was not an instigating factor in the crisis. He states:
125 Indeed, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, which was put in place “to examine the causes, 
domestic and global, of the current fi nancial and economic crisis in the United States” in accordance 
with section 5 of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub L No 111-21, § 5, 123 Stat 1616-
25, acknowledged, “[t]here [were] many competing views as to the causes of [the] crisis.” Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission, supra note 2 at xxv. See e.g. ibid at 411-538 (for dissenting views in the 
Report by four members of the Commission).
126 See Adrian Blundell-Wignall, “Structured Products: Implications for Financial Markets” (2007) 93:2 
Financial Market Trends 27 at 45, online: OECD <http://www.oecd.org>; Alberto Manconi, 
Massimo Massa & Ayako Yasuda, “The Role of Institutional Investors in Propagating the Financial 
Crisis of 2007-2008” (2012) 104 J Fin Econ 491 at 492, n 9. 
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Rob Goldsmith, “‘Intoxicated’Institutional Investors: How the Financial Crisis Infected the Real 
Economy,” INSEAD Knowledge (15 June 2010), online: INSEAD <http:/www.insead.edu>.
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Securitization generally is not the problem currently. It is not the 
cause of the crisis. Securitization is an effi cient form of fi nancing, 
and there is no evidence that there is a systematic agency problem in 
its functioning. Rather, the particular form of the design of subprime 
mortgages is at root the problem. It was highly sensitive to house 
prices, and this sensitivity was passed through to a variety of other 
fi nancial structures.130 
Gorton believes that the subprime mortgage market, by itself, is too small to 
cause a crisis of such magnitude.131 Instead, he compares the collapse of the subprime 
market to an E. coli infection in a nation’s beef supply.132 The infection itself is only 
a small problem, but an ensuing panic can cause the entire beef industry to collapse.
He contends that the shadow banking system is, “genuine banking and, [as] it turns 
out, [is] vulnerable to the same kind of bank runs as in previous U.S. history.”133 A 
banking panic occurs when “information insensitive” debt becomes “information 
sensitive” due to a shock.134 He argues that the events starting in August 2007 can 
best be understood as a wholesale banking panic involving institutions, whereby “fi rms 
[withdrew] from other fi rms” (unlike the retail banking panics of the 19th and early 
20th centuries, where individual depositors withdrew from their banks).135 In the crisis, 
falling house prices caused a shock to subprime mortgage values. Large fi nancial fi rms 
“ran” on other fi nancial fi rms. These large fi nancial fi rms refused to rollover their sale 
and repurchase agreements (repos) or to increase the repo margin (called a “haircut”) 
after having grave doubts about the collateral that was being offered: securities-
based residential mortgages.136 This chain of events forced massive deleveraging 
and resulted in an insolvent banking system. Therefore, Gorton contends that the 
banking panic was triggered, and not caused, by the collapse of the subprime market. 
He admits, “[t]here is much work to be done to understand the ongoing panic, to 
formally test my (sometimes admittedly vague) conjectures, and it will be [sic] surely 
be some time before researchers can sort through the events.”137 Nevertheless, 
Gorton’s research provides an interesting counterpoint to the widely accepted view 
that the originate-to-distribute model of lending played a causal role in the crisis.
130 Gary B Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010) at 146 [Gorton, The Panic of 2007]. Gorton provides a detailed analysis on subprime mortgage 
design at 61-114 (particularly at 74-81).
131 Gary B Gorton, “Questions and Answers about the Financial Crisis: Prepared for the U.S. Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission” (20 February 2010) [unpublished, archived at the Social Science Research 
Network] at 6, online: Social Science Research Network <http://www.ssrn.com>.
132 Gorton, The Panic of 2007, supra note 130 at 112-13. See also Gary B Gorton, “E-coli, Repo Madness, 
and the Financial Crisis” (2010) 45:3 Bus Econ 164.
133 Gorton, The Panic of 2007, supra note 130 at 6.
134 Ibid at 32-33.
135 Ibid at 16.
136 Ibid at 61-114.
137 Ibid at 145.
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C.   Developments Arising from the Crisis
The fallout from the crisis led to numerous calls for accountability. The OTC 
derivatives market, despite its long existence, was suddenly being referenced in the 
media as part of the “dark markets” that “fueled [the] meltdown.”138 “Dark” implied 
that the markets were not overseen by a specialized governing authority like the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). When asked who was to blame for the crisis, US Treasury 
Secretary Timothy F. Geithner did not place the blame on the mortgage lenders 
that had enticed borrowers to accept mortgages beyond their means. He did not 
cite greed on the part of the fi nancial institutions or imprudence on the part of 
the borrowers. Instead, Secretary Geithner stated, “[t]he fi nancial crisis was caused 
by signifi cant gaps in oversight,” and that “[o]ne of the reasons crisis can spread so 
rapidly… is the uncertainty people have in judging risk.”139 
The above-identifi ed events from the global fi nancial crisis provide a striking 
example of how large corporate institutions are almost regarded as beasts that 
need to be tamed,140 with regulatory bodies acting as the lion tamers who are at 
fault if there is injury to the public. While it is certainly reasonable and necessary 
to have a level of expectation rest upon the state to govern corporate behaviour 
to the extent that it affects the wider community, the ability of institutions to 
disregard the impact their corporate actions have on stakeholders is discouraging.
Furthermore, the level of infl uence these institutions wield on the very governing 
bodies that are supposed to regulate them, through lobbying efforts or otherwise, 
is most troubling.
Until the crisis, the OTDM may have been perceived by outsiders as an 
acceptable approach that furthered the goal of increasing profi t or share value 
under the shareholder primacy model. As such, the managers were doing what 
they were supposed to do within one set of norms that guided their behaviour. 
The government failed by allowing these institutions to get carried away with 
their legally permitted (and arguably encouraged) activities. The OTDM, NINA 
mortgages, the greed of the mortgage lenders, imprudence of the mortgage 
borrowers, incessant lobbying by profi t-maximizing corporations and over-hedging 
by fi nancial products traders all played an undeniable role in the lead-up to the 
crisis. However, most of those involved have not been touched by the law because, 
despite “breathtakingly bad behavior” and “real dishonesty” of those involved,141 
138 David Cho & Zachary A Goldfarb, “U.S. Pushes Ahead with Derivatives Regulation,” The  Washington 
Post (14 May 2009) A01, online: The Washington Post <http://www.washingtonpost.com>.
139 Ibid.
140 This metaphor has been used in the past, the well-known reference being from Ralph Nader, Mark 
Green & Joel Seligman, Taming the Giant Corporation (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1976).
141 Cristie Ford, “New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: Lessons from Financial Regulation” 
(2010) 2 Wis L Rev 441 at 461.
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no laws were broken.142 The public’s reaction to the crisis was to hold someone 
accountable, but the governing authorities were willing to allow both the law 
and regulators to shoulder much of the blame. Thus, the crisis has illustrated how 
corporate behaviour, infl uenced by the governance structure in capital markets, can 
have the inexplicable result of causing both the public and governmental authorities 
to hold market rules accountable for failing to restrict corporate conduct, rather 
than blaming the actual corporate conduct itself.
IV. COMPARING PERSPECTIVES IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS
Looking back at the three perspectives identifi ed by Deakin and Konzelmann 
following the scandals of 2001 and 2002 in Part II(B), one can see how there are 
contrasting notes this time around. The position of the fi rst group, which held that 
market sanctions alone were effective disciplinary devices, cannot seriously be 
considered any longer in the wake of the global fi nancial crisis. In fact, the crisis may 
have destroyed the very premise on which this position rests. In an article published 
in The New York Times in September of 2009, Paul Krugman criticizes economists 
like Olivier Blanchard, now Economic Counsellor (chief economist) at the IMF, 
for their declaration of a positive economic state prior to the fi nancial crisis.143 
Blanchard wrote an article in 2008 declaring that “the state of macro[economics] is 
good,”144 and in a tone reminiscent of Hansmann and Kraakman, argued that “there 
has been broad convergence in vision” and methodology for macroeconomics.145 
Krugman writes, 
The renewed romance with the idealized market was, to be sure, 
partly a response to shifting political winds, partly a response to 
fi nancial incentives …. Unfortunately, this romanticized and sani-
tized vision of the economy led most economists to ignore all the 
things that can go wrong. They turned a blind eye to the limitations 
of human rationality that often lead to bubbles and busts; to the 
problems of institutions that run amok; to the imperfections 
142 On April 16, 2010, the SEC charged Goldman Sachs with fraud for placing fi nancial bets on the pre-
diction that the investments it created and sold through the originate-to-distribute model of lending 
would fail. See “Watch This Case,” Editorial, The New York Times (17 April 2010) A16, online: The New 
York Times <http://www.nytimes.com>; Sewell Chan & Louise Story, “S.E.C. Settling its Com-
plaints with Goldman: $550 Million Penalty in Subprime Case,” The New York Times (16 July 2010) 
A1, online: The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com>. On August 9, 2012, the US Justice 
Department stated that it would not bring fraud charges against Goldman Sachs for its role in the 
mortgage crisis. See Reed Albergotti & Elizabeth Rappaport, “US Not Seeking Goldman Charges,” 
The  Wall Street Journal (9 August 2012) C1, online: The Wall Street Journal <http://online.wsj.com>. 
143 Paul Krugman, “How Did Economists Get it So Wrong?” The New York Times (2 September 2009) 
MM36, online: The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com> [Krugman, “Economists”].
144 Olivier J Blanchard, “The State of Macro” (2009) 1 Annu Rev Econ 209 at 210. 
145 Ibid; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note3.
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of markets—especially fi nancial markets—that can cause the 
economy’s operating system to undergo sudden, unpredictable 
crashes; and to the dangers created when regulators don’t believe 
in regulation.146
Posner, however, has found the large apportionment of blame laid upon 
capitalism to be misdirected. In his analysis of the crisis, Posner admits that 
“[l]aissez-faire capitalism failed us,”147 but on the question of whether the industry 
or the government was more responsible, Posner emphatically believes the 
responsibility lies with the government. For Posner, “[the] government allowed 
the preconditions of depression to develop and wreak havoc with the economy,”148 
and it was the government that provided “responses to the crisis [that] were late, 
slow, indecisive, and poorly articulated.”149 Directing a pointed attack at Krugman, 
Posner states: “[t]he journalists and politicians, and some who should know better, 
like the distinguished macroeconomist Paul Krugman, are engaged in an orgy of 
recrimination against Wall Street. They have the wrong target. The responsibility 
for building the fences that prevent an economic collapse as a result of risky lending 
devolves on the government.”150 
Posner has been careful to distance himself from scholars who have applied 
behavioural analysis in the autopsy of blame. He has insisted that those on Wall 
Street were acting rationally, calling the media coverage of Wall Street greed and 
extravagance as “ignorant” and “silly” and rhetorically asking: “What did reporters 
think businessmen were like?”151 He insists that blame rests on the lack of regulation 
by the government, and not the rational actions conducted by individuals which 
ultimately led to the crisis. Posner states:
By having over a period of decades largely deregulated banking, and 
credit generally, the government inadvertently allowed the rational 
self-interested decisions of private actors—bankers, mortgage 
brokers, real estate salesmen, homeowners, and others—to bring 
on a fi nancial crisis that the government was unable to prevent from 
molting into a depression. A profound failure of the market was 
abetted by governmental inaction.152
146 Krugman, “Economists,” supra note 143.
147 Richard A Posner, A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of ‘08 and the Descent into Depression (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2009) at 236 [Posner, Failure of Capitalism].
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid at 285.
151 Ibid at xiii.
152 Ibid at 242-43.
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Posner’s position is helpful in highlighting many of the problematic argu-
ments generally advanced by avid supporters of the shareholder primacy model. 
First, Posner has identifi ed reckless behaviour—which was clearly evidenced in the 
OTDM and the NINA mortgages—as rational. Second, as the previous narratives 
have shown, Posner has ignored how large institutions are capable of invoking 
powerful and unrelenting lobbying efforts on US lawmakers when issues regarding 
their regu lation and governance are at stake. Lastly, Posner’s position seems to be 
an about-face on the Chicago School’s usual free market position regarding the 
government’s role in regulating industries, a position it maintained even after the 
Enron scandal.153
Posner has admitted that he and the Chicago School erroneously believed 
“that markets were perfect, which is to say self-regulating, and that government 
intervention in them almost always made things worse.”154 He has berated the three 
major CRAs—Moody’s, S&P and Fitch—and argued that they should each lose 
their quasi-offi cial status as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 
for their role in perpetuating the crisis.155 Surprisingly, Posner suggests, among 
other things, that reinstating the GSA is a viable and realistic solution.156 The Chicago 
School of law and economics may need to readjust itself to the new political and 
economic climate. If it does not readjust, the Chicago School’s infl uence will weaken 
as other fi elds of study gain greater traction.
Still, Posner’s strong reproach of governmental inaction during the crisis 
does not mean he shied away from recognizing that the crisis was also “a failure of 
capitalism”157 and the unfettered market. Deakin and Konzelmann’s fi rst position 
examined in response to the scandals of 2001 and 2002—being the belief that 
laissez-faire market sanctions are suffi cient in times of fi nancial turmoil—is now 
on tenuous ground. It is easy to call Enron an aberration and leave things as the 
status quo. However, the global fi nancial crisis cannot be called an aberration, a 
market hiccup or a normal bubble that burst. The US government’s $700 billion 
bailout and stimulus package has signifi cantly limited the viability of that argument. 
The crisis has thus caused many belonging in the fi rst group, including Posner, to 
make a strong shift into the second group that is focused on improving corporate 
behaviour through the tightening of securities regulation.
In fear of the crisis causing the “second Great Depression,”158 the US 
government fi rst implemented emergency response legislation through the American 
153 See e.g. Becker, supra note 55.
154 Richard A Posner, The Crisis of Capitalist Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010) 
at 331-32.
155 Ibid at 349-50.
156 Ibid at 353-54. But see supra note 97 (which discusses the problems with reinstating the GSA).
157 See Posner, Failure of Capitalism, supra note 147.
158 Eileen Ng, “Krugman: World Avoided Second Great Depression,” The Huffi ngton Post (10 August 2009), 
online: The Huffi ngton Post <http://www.huffi ngtonpost.com>.
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Housing Rescue and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008159 and the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008,160 the latter of which authorized the government’s 
$700 billion bailout. Following these Acts, President Barack Obama announced his 
support of the “Volcker Rule,” named after Paul Volcker, head of the President’s 
Economic Recovery Advisory Board and former Chairman of the US Federal 
Reserve. The Volcker Rule specifi cally prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary 
trading that is not undertaken on behalf of its clients, and from owning or investing 
in a hedge fund or private equity fund. It also limits the liabilities that the largest 
banks can hold.161 
Volcker’s appointment has been heartening for many who are seeking more 
aggressive ways to reform Wall Street. As part of his argument that banks should 
be prevented from taking advantage of governmental safety nets in order to make 
speculative investments, Volcker has acknowledged the need for deep, sweeping and 
multifaceted structural reform in the fi nancial services industry, while also pointing 
to reform measures that may substantially alter the internal governance of fi nancial 
institutions.162 
Volcker’s participation in governmental reform efforts has led to numerous 
changes that have been adopted in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (DFA), which President Obama signed into law on July 21, 2010.163 Its 
preamble states that the purposes of the Act are “[t]o promote the fi nancial stability 
of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the fi nancial 
system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, 
[and] to protect consumers from abusive fi nancial services practices.”164 Resonating 
with voices from Deakin and Konzelmann’s second group, the legislation puts a 
great deal of faith in the watchful eye of regulators to prevent another fi nancial 
crisis, “leav[ing] the fi nancial industry largely intact but facing a more powerful 
159 US, Bill HR 3221, 107th Cong, 2008 (engrossed within the enacted Housing and Economic Recovery Act 
of 2008, Pub L 110-289, 122 Stat 2654).
160 Pub L No 110-343, 122 Stat 3765.
161 Ibid. Five former US Treasury Secretaries endorsed the Volcker Rule in a Letter to the Editor in 
The  Wall Street Journal. W Michael Blumenthal et al, “Congress Should Implement the Volcker Rule 
for Banks,” The  Wall Street Journal (22 February 2010), online:  The Wall Street Journal <http://
online.wsj.com>.
162 Paul Volcker, “How to Reform Our Financial System,” The New York Times (31 January 2010) WK11, 
online: The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com>. Volcker has also stated: “We ought to 
have some very large institutions whose primary purpose is a kind of fi duciary responsibility to service 
consumers, individuals, businesses and governments by providing outlets for their money and by pro-
viding credit…. They ought to be the core of the credit and fi nancial system. Those institutions should 
not engage in highly risky entrepreneurial activity.” David Cho & Binyamin Appelbaum, “Obama’s 
‘Volcker Rule’ shifts power away from Geithner,” The Washington Post (22 January 2010), online: 
The Washington Post <http://www.washingtonpost.com>.
163 Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010) [DFA]. After much political wrangling, the DFA was 
approved by the House of Representatives on June 30, 2010, and approved by the Senate on July 15, 
2010. THOMAS: The Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status 111th Congress (2009-2010) H.R. 4173.
164 DFA, supra note 163 at Preamble. 
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network of regulators who could impose limits on risky activities.”165 The Act 
creates new agencies to police consumer lending, fi nancial products innovations 
and trading in the dark markets of complex derivatives. Consumer lending is now 
under the purview of a new consumer fi nancial protection bureau,166 while the 
SEC is granted authority to broaden the regulation of hedge funds and CRAs.167 
Many derivatives are now required to be traded through clearinghouses, and traders 
must disclose pricing data to encourage transparency and competition.168  The Act 
also increases the regulatory powers of the Federal Reserve; establishes a systemic 
risk council to detect potential threats to the overall fi nancial system; and provides 
new powers to constrain and even dismantle troubled companies, forcing creditors 
and shareholders to bear losses so taxpayers do not end up footing the bill.169 
Nevertheless, the Act still “leaves a vast number of details for regulators to work 
out,” which some point out is “inevitably setting off another round of battles that 
could last for years.”170 
Prior to the fi nal approval of the bill, a fl urry of lobbying efforts and deal-
making allowed several industries to escape many of the provisions found in the 
DFA. Intense lobbying efforts translated into automobile dealers receiving an 
exemption from oversight by the new consumer bureau, despite being “among 
the biggest originators of consumer credit in America….”171 Dealers argued that 
the rules would place unnecessary restrictions on their fi nancing businesses. The 
Obama administration opposed such an exemption, but gave in to these demands 
during negotiations. Most signifi cantly, industry lobbyists made a concerted effort 
to push for a series of exemptions to the Volcker Rule that would allow banks to 
continue to operate businesses as investment funds that hold only client funds.172 
Asset management and insurance companies pushed for a carve-out to exclude them 
from the Act outright, succeeding in large part.173 As well, Senator Scott Brown, 
the Republican representative from Massachusetts, pushed for an exemption from 
165 David Cho, Jia Lynn Yang & Brady Dennis, “Lawmakers Guide Dodd-Frank Bill for Wall Street 
Reform Into Homestretch,” The  Washington Post (26 June 2010), online: The Washington Post 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com>.
166 DFA, supra note 163, §§ 1011-18. See also Peter J Henning, “A New World Begins for Wall Street 
Oversight,” The New York Times (19 July 2010), online: The New York Times Dealbook <http://
dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/19/a-new-world-begins-for-wall-street-oversight/>.
167 DFA, supra note 163, §§ 401-416, 931-39H.
168 Ibid, §§ 701-74
169 Ibid, §§ 101-213. 
170 Binyamin Appelbaum & David M Herszenhorn, “Financial Overhaul Signals Shift on Deregulation,” 
The New York Times (16 July 2010) A1, online: The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com>; 
Henning, supra note 166.
171 Michael Riley, “Auto Dealers Fight Regulatory Reform Bill,” The Denver Post (11 May 2010), online: 
The Denver Post <http://www.denverpost.com/commented/ci_15058324?source=commented>.
172 Eric Dash & Nelson D Schwartz, “Bank Lobbyists Make a Run at Reform Measures,” The New  York 
Times (21 June 2010) B1, online: The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com> (namely hedge 
funds and private equity units).
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the Volcker Rule that would allow banks to continue to invest in hedge funds and 
private equity fi rms, which ultimately succeeded.174 It was reported that Brown 
was largely focused on assisting the corporate interests of Boston-based money 
management giants like Fidelity Investments and State Street Corporation, but the 
exemption also allows many of the fi nancial institutions at the core of the crisis to 
keep any assets or subsidiaries that would have violated such regulations.175 
Volcker himself endorsed the fi nal version of the DFA, “but unenthusias-
tically.”176 He believes that banks still have “too much wiggle room to repeat the 
behavior that threw the nation into crisis in the fi rst place.”177 Both critics and 
endorsers alike have also contended that the Volcker Rule has been weakened to 
the point where it will likely be ineffective in its application.178 Many have pointed 
out that the DFA leaves so much decision-making in the hands of regulators that it 
could lead to a fi eld day for lobbyists in the fi nancial industry.179 
Unlike what was seen following the corporate and accounting scandals 
of 2001 and 2002, the US government has not capitalized on efforts to improve 
governance within the institutions that brought about the crisis. Other than 
allowing shareholders to have an advisory vote on executive compensation—which 
conceptually aligns with the principles behind the shareholder primacy model—
there are no corporate governance reform measures addressed in this legislation, 
let alone any that challenge the present-day model. There are no regulations set 
to tighten internal governance, make boards more competent and accountable 
for complex risk-taking activity, improve internal risk management or address 
stakeholder interests in corporate decision-making. Any considerations regarding 
other structural corporate governance reform, as expressed in Deakin and 
Konzelmann’s third group, do not appear in the legislation created in reaction to 
the crisis. President Obama indirectly said this himself, stating that “unless your 
174 Stephen Gandel, “In Financial Reform, Rules Made to Be Broken,” TIME (28 June 2010), online: 
TIME <http://www.time.com>. See also Yalman Onaran, “Volcker Said to Be Disappointed with Final 
Version of His Rule,” Bloomberg (30 June 2010), online: Bloomberg <http://www.bloomberg.com>.
175 See Gandel, supra note 174; Dash & Schwartz, supra note 172.
176 Louis Uchitelle, “Volcker, Loud and Clear: Pushing for Stronger Reforms, and Regretting Decades of 
Silence,” The New York Times (11 July 2010) BU1 [Uchitelle, “Loud and Clear”].
177 Ibid. 
178 See e.g. William K Black, “Why the Financial Reform Bill  Won’t Prevent Another Crisis,” CNN Money 
(26 July 2010), online: CNN Money <http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/18/news/economy/
fi nreg_law_incentives_bill-black.fortune/index.htm> (which argues that the bill does not address 
perverse compensation incentives); Mark Thoma, “The Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Bill” CBS Money 
Watch (15 July 2010), online: CBS News <http://www.cbsnews.com> (which describes how the 
Volcker Rule has been so weakened by exemptions that it is likely to be ineffectual); Aline van Duyn & 
Francesco Guerrera, “Dodd-Frank Bill is No Glass-Steagall,” Financial Times (27 June 2010), online: 
Financial Times <http://www.ft.com/cms> (which describes the bill as one “that came out of 
a 20-hour horse-trading session,” and in which fi rms “have to navigate a maze of prohibitions”). 
But see Reid Cramer, “Dodd-Frank Financial Reform:  The Rise of the Regulators,” The Huffi ngton Post 
(13 July 2010), online:  The Huffi ngton Post <http://www.huffi ngtonpost.com> (which argues that 
the bill “will actually go a long way to create … meaningful reform”).
179 Dash & Schwartz, supra note 172.
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business model depends on bilking people, there is little to fear from these new 
rules.”180
Indeed, the corporate behaviour of these institutions may prove President 
Obama’s words to be true. Wall Street fi rms have aggressively sought ways to get 
around restrictions in the DFA. For example, according to media reports, “UBS 
prepared a 20-page ‘action plan’ outlining various options [to curtail the effects 
of the Act], while senior managers at Goldman Sachs had preliminary discussions 
on eventually dropping its status as a federally insured bank, allowing it to escape 
several of the most stringent provisions in the new law.”181 It was also reported that 
“Wall Street trading fl oors are buzzing about creative ways to possibly limit the 
impact” of the Volcker Rule, with unidentifi ed traders informing reporters that “it 
will be tricky for regulators to defi ne what [legally] constitutes a proprietary trade 
as opposed to a reasonable hedge against looming risks. Therefore, banks might still 
be able to make big bets by simply classifying them differently.”182 Frank Partnoy 
commented: “Wall Street has always been very skilled at getting around rules, 
and this law will be no exception… Once you open up the door just a crack, 
Wall Street shoves the door open and runs right through it.”183 Volcker also stated 
that “[p]eople are nervous about the long-term outlook, and they should be.”184 
It seems that US culture is at least passively settled with the shareholder 
primacy model as it currently exists. Governments are responsible for adjusting 
legal rules to restrain certain incentives that guide the existing model. If corporate 
conduct causes negative ramifi cations to society without appropriate regulation to 
address it, the solution is to create reactionary law to prevent such conduct from 
recurring in the future. It suggests that a cyclical pattern of disaster and reactionary 
lawmaking will always accompany the fi nancial markets if the shareholder primacy 
model is here to stay. This pattern is particularly concerning as innovative fi nancial 
products are produced with a level of speed and complexity that has regulators 
struggling to keep up. After considering the regulatory overhaul plan when it was 
initially proposed by the Obama administration, even before it was whittled down by 
lobbying groups and partisan politics, Krugman already saw that it was not enough, 
stating that “[i]t seems all too likely that the industry will soon go back to playing 
the same games that got us into this mess in the fi rst place.”185 If lasting change on 
a broader scale is expected, other pathways to reform—namely, those resonating 
from Deakin and Konzelmann’s third group—need to be considered.
180 Office of the Press Secretary, Press Release, “Remarks by the President on Wall Street Reform” 
(22 April 2010), online:  The White House <http://www.whitehouse.gov>.
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185 Paul Krugman, “Don’t Cry for Wall Street,” The New York Times (23 April 2010) A27, online: 
The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com>.
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V. RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM
A. Borrowing Old and New Institutional Approaches
The focal point of this article is to shed new light onto old arguments that critique 
the shareholder primacy model, using modern fi nancial calamities as the compelling 
backdrop. In the pursuit of an alternative corporate governance model, there may be 
value in reconsidering the issue by borrowing elements from both institutional law 
and economics and new institutional economics (NIE). This section fi rst provides 
very brief descriptions of elements within the two fi elds that may assist as a starting 
point for reforming the shareholder primacy model, and then offers examples of 
structural reform in the business world. 
Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G. Medema state that “[f]rom the Institutional 
perspective, law is fundamentally a matter of rights creation and re-creation.”186 
The government is seen as playing a central and inevitable role within the process 
because “[r]ights are whatever interests government protects vis-à-vis other 
interests when there is a confl ict.”187 Signifi cance rests on the issue of whose rights 
are enabled through law, as well as on the subsequent structures that perpetuate 
those rights. Thus, “terms such as regulation, deregulation, and government inter-
vention [are] misleading,” as the critical issue “turns on whose interests government 
allows to be realized and who is able to use government for what ends.”188 
The recognition of governmental rights creation also means institutional 
scholars challenge their neoclassical counterparts on the notion of an ultimate 
effi cient result, arguing that an outcome is effi cient only with regard to an assumed 
initial structure of rights.189  The way in which a structure is formed “will give rise to 
a particular set of prices, costs, outputs, and the like, and thus to a particular effi cient 
allocation of resources.”190 In this sense, institutional scholars strongly contend that 
“[t]here is no independent test by which the law’s solution can be said to be the 
effi cient solution.”191 A structural change means a corresponding modifi cation to 
what is regarded as most effi cient. As Warren J. Samuels asserts, “[t]o argue that 
wealth maximization [or any other effi ciency criterion] can determine rights serves 
only to mask a choice of which interests to protect as rights. Legal decisions or 
changes can be said to be effi cient only from the point of view of the party whose 
186 Mercuro & Medema, supra note 12 at 224. 
187 Warren J Samuels, “Commentary: An Economic Perspective on the Compensation Problem” (1974) 
21:1 Wayne L Rev 113 at 127.
188 Mercuro & Medema, supra note 12 at 225.
189 A Allan Schmid, “Law and Economics: An Institutional Perspective” in Nicholas Mercuro, ed, 
Law and Economics (Boston: Kluwer, 1989) 57 at 68-69.
190 Mercuro & Medema, supra note 12 at 227. 
191 Warren J Samuels, “Maximization of Wealth as Justice: An Essay on Posnerian Law and Economics 
as Policy Analysis,” Book Review of  The Economics of Justice by Richard A Posner, (1981) 60 Tex L 
Rev 147 at 155. 
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interests are given effect ….”192 Because the government and institutional structures 
are seen as primary sources through which control or power is effectuated, the main 
focus of institutional scholars is to understand how the governmental allocation 
of rights within such institutions shapes the performance of the economic system 
over time.193
The recognition of alternative effi cient solutions, as well as the contingent 
nature of any “effi cient” result on a presumed rights structure and defi nition of 
output, exposes the inherent normative elements embodied within the share-
holder primacy model. The term “shareholder primacy” itself leaves little doubt 
as to which corporate actor is perceived as having the greatest legal and normative 
rights. Having share value as the principle measure of interest amplifi es how “[t]he 
determination of a particular effi cient solution involves a normative and selective 
choice as to whose interests will be accommodated, who will realize gains, and 
who will realize losses.”194 Alternative legal models that allocate rights differently, 
or include other methods of calculating output, will invariably point to different 
effi cient outcomes.
NIE is also valuable to consider as it “consists of answering new questions, 
why economic institutions emerged the way they did and not otherwise; it merges 
into economic history, but brings sharper [microanalytic] … reasoning to bear 
than had been customary.”195 NIE asserts, among other things, that “institutions 
do matter” and “the determinants of institutions are susceptible to analysis by the 
tools of economic theory.”196 There are several elements within NIE that overlap 
with behavioural approaches; many NIE scholars reject formal rational behaviour, 
and advocate models based on Simon’s bounded rationality,197 among others.
The institutional component of this fi eld may provide that crucial missing link 
between neoclassical and behavioural approaches that is needed for a structural 
reform of the existing governance model. NIE may help to answer the question, 
192 Ibid at 154. 
193 Mercuro & Medema, supra note 12 at 224-26. Institutional scholars take a critical look at the measure 
in which neoclassical effi ciency is calculated. For institutional scholars, “[t]he defi nition of ‘output’—
of what it is that one is to be effi cient about—requires an antecedent normative specifi cation as to 
the appropriate performance goal for society. Social output (the aggregate well-being of society), 
consumptive output (the value of goods from the consumer point of view), and productive output 
(the value of goods from the producer point of view, i.e., profi ts) are three examples of the alternatives 
that are available. The value-laden choice of a particular defi nition of output as the maxim, which in 
effect is the choice of a particular social welfare function where many are possible, will drive the deci-
sion as to what constitutes the effi cient allocation.” Ibid at 228. See also Warren J Samuels, “Norma-
tive Premises in Regulatory Theory” (1978) 1:1 J Post Keynesian Econ 100 at 102-4 (the ideas in the 
preceding quote from Mercuro & Medema are attributed to Samuels’ 1978 piece).
194 Mercuro & Medema, supra note 12 at 229.
195 Kenneth J Arrow, “Refl ections on the Essays” in George Feiwel, ed, Arrow and the Foundations of the 
Theory of Economic Policy (New York: New York University Press, 1987) 727 at 734.
196 R C O Matthews, “The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Economic Growth” (1986) 
96:384  The Econ J 903 at 903.
197 See Simon, Administrative Behavior, supra note 59 and Simon, Models of Man, supra note 59.
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“why [do] less than optimal arrangements persist over time[?]”198 And more 
importantly, how can these suboptimal arrangements be changed?
Walter W. Powell has argued that “the full power of the institutional 
perspective has yet to be realized due in part to ambiguities in some of the initial 
contributions to this line of work and to the fact that a somewhat stylized version of 
institutional theory—a restricted institutionalism—has thus far been explicated.”199 
NIE’s emphasis on environmental factors, power imbalances, political infl uences 
and economic arrangements are only some themes that may add considerable value 
when rethinking corporate governance reform. Admittedly, there is much more 
still to be developed in NIE; within the fi eld there are several competing voices and 
ideas. But as Oliver Williamson put it, “NIE is informative and should be included 
as part of the reform calculus.”200 
There is friction within the two fi elds—institutional law and economics 
had its glory days in the 1920s and 1930s201 but continues to resonate in law and 
economics scholarship, whereas NIE (which was coined by Oliver Williamson in 
the 1970s) has been gaining popularity in academic circles and claims have been 
made that “its best days lie ahead.”202 NIE seeks to differentiate itself from old 
institutional theory and offers vibrant discussions to present-day issues. This 
tension may prove useful to corporate governance reformists; elements from both 
approaches help to clarify and broaden the scope of the issues that are necessary to 
consider when establishing a theoretical basis for reform.The following sections 
examine reform efforts that are taking place to alter the current shareholder 
primacy model of the American business world.
B. “Other Constituency” Statutes and the B Corporation
Consideration of stakeholder interests has generally been allowed under several 
US state laws since as far back as the 1980s, when the takeover boom saw several 
states implement “other constituency” (also known as “nonshareholder consti-
tuency”203 or “corporate constituency”204) legislation expressly permitting (and in 
198 Walter W Powell, “Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis” in Walter W Powell & Paul J 
DiMaggio, eds, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1991) at 183.
199 Ibid.
200 Oliver Williamson, “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead” (2000) 38:3 
J Econ Literature 595 at 610. 
201 John F Bell, A History of Economic Thought (New York: Ronald, 1967) at 568, cited in Mercuro & 
Medema, supra note 12 at 208.
202 Williamson, supra note 200 at 611.
203 Stephen M Bainbridge, “Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes” (1992) 19:3 Pepp L Rev 
971  [Bainbridge, “Nonshareholder Constituencies”].
204 Lawrence E Mitchell, “A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency 
Statutes” (1992) 70:3  Tex L Rev 579.
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at least one state, requiring205) directors to consider stakeholders in their decision-
making.206 Over 40 states have implemented such legislation.207 
B Lab is a Philadelphia-based non-profi t organization that has capita-
lized on the other constituency statutes. The self-imposed and privately regulated 
B Corporation rating system and certifi cation represents an attempt to establish a 
new form of socially-minded corporation “which harnesses the power of private 
enterprise to create public benefi t.”208 The B Corporation uses available state 
laws to form its base. A company must already be incorporated in a state with an 
other constituency statute, or must re-incorporate in a jurisdiction with such a 
statute in order to become a B Corporation.209 The B Corporation is attempting 
to “use the power of business to solve social and environmental problems.”210 
At the time of this article, there are 635 US B Corporations, with the number 
steadily increasing.211 
In order to become a B Corporation, a company is fi rst required to take a 
B Impact Assessment which asks socially-minded questions relating to accountabi-
lity, employees, consumers, community and the environment.212 B Lab’s governance-
related questions strongly imply support for greater stakeholder-based and 
board-controlled management. A corporation is certifi ed once an acceptable 
score is obtained under their Rating System, and the company is required to 
submit supporting documents for a portion of the answers.213 B Lab relies on this 
certifi cation and a separate auditing system to ensure B Corporations are pursuing 
and achieving their social mandates. Within an allotted time following certifi  -
cation, B Corporations are also required to amend their articles of incorporation 
to permit directors to consider more than just shareholder interests when carrying 
out their duties.214 
205 Connecticut Business Corporation Act, Conn Stat tit 33 § 33-600-33-998 (2011) [Connecticut Act].
206 See also Andrew Keay, “Moving towards Stakeholderism? Constituency Statutes, Enlightened 
Shareholder Value, and More: Much Ado about Little?” (2011) 22:1 Eur Bus L Rev 1 (for examples 
of wider interests groups, which includes community and societal considerations); Bainbridge, 
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net/declaration>.
209 B Corporation, The Legal Requirement, online: B Corporation <http://www.bcorporation.net/
become/legal>.
210 B Corporation, What is a B Corp?, online: B Corporation <http://www.bcorporation.net/about>.
211 B Corporation, FAQ, online: B Corporation <http://www.bcorporation.net/faq> (for a point of 
reference, in August 2008, there were 120 B Corporations).
212 See e.g. B Corporation, B Impact Assessment 2010, online: B Corporation <http://www.bcorporation.
net/resources/bcorp/documents/2010-B-Impact-Assessment%20(1).pdf>. Participants also receive 
questions specifi c to their industry.
213 B Corporation, Become a B Corporation, online: B Corporation <http://www.bcorporation.net/
become-a-b-Corp>.
214 Ibid.
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It is important to include stakeholder interests in directorial decision-
making during potential change of control scenarios, and explicitly indicate that 
directors may select an offer with a lower share price based on stakeholder interests 
in order to carve out any implications arising from the landmark decision in Revlon, 
Inc v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc215 (Revlon). In the case, the Supreme Court of 
Delaware held that directors owe a fi duciary duty to maximize shareholder value in 
takeover contexts, regardless of nonshareholder interests. The Revlon decision is 
generally regarded as one of the leading judicial precedent in support of the share -
holder primacy model, and B Lab has elected to address the matter head-on. To 
date, there have been no legal challenges to any of B Lab’s suggested amendments 
to company articles. 
While the numbers are impressive given the grassroots nature of this 
phenomenon, the number of B Corporations is infi nitesimally small when compared 
to the amount of corporations existing in the United States, which, according to 
the US Census Bureau, totals over 27 million businesses.216  Dana Brakman Reiser 
cautions that “it remains to be seen whether this system will have strong teeth.”217 
She comments that:
[T]he B corporation form realistically offers only moral, rather 
than legal, assurances to non-shareholder constituencies and social 
interests. Stakeholders have no structural rights in governance, and 
no additional parties are granted standing to litigate. B corporation 
directors are empowered to act in the interests of other consti-
tuencies; whether they do so will depend on their own desires or 
feelings of moral obligation.218 
Given that B Lab is a private organization, it does not have the authority to 
manipulate existing legal structures. Nevertheless, the B Impact Assessment goes to 
the core of the business purpose and mission, and addresses stakeholder interests 
and sustainability concerns. Corporations may choose to become B Corporations 
so they can align themselves with like-minded companies, and the B Corporation 
branding may “draw in directors committed to a blended mission and investors 
willing to enforce it.”219 It could one day be a certifi cation popularly recognizable 
to consumers. 
215 506 A2d 173, ALR 4th 157 (Del Sup Ct 1985) [Revlon].
216 United States Department of Commerce, Statistics about Business Size (including Small Business) from 
the U.S. Census Bureau, online: United States Census Bureau <http://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.
html>. This number is as of 2009. More recent statistics are unavailable. 
217 Dana Brakman Reiser, “Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise” (2010) 85 Chicago-Kent L Rev 
619 at 643.
218 Ibid at 642.
219 Ibid at 643.
226 REVUE DE DROIT D’OTTAWA OTTAWA LAW REVIEW
43:2 43:2
B Corporation advocates have been involved in encouraging state govern-
ments, such as those in Maryland and Vermont (which will be examined in the next 
section), to change their corporate laws to create the legal infrastructure neces -
sary for business/mission hybrid corporations. As a strategic movement that has 
tapped on the shoulders of business leaders and politicians for support, the B Corpo-
ration may become meaningful in changing the way corporations are perceived to 
do business. 
C. State Benefi t Corporations
In 2010, the states of Maryland and Vermont each passed “benefi t corporation” 
legis lation, facilitating new corporate structures designed to create both social 
benefi ts and shareholder value.220 Maryland’s benefi t corporation laws took effect on 
October 1, 2010221 and Vermont’s on July 11, 2011.222 Several states have followed 
suit.223 There are no tax incentives attributed with these laws.
The laws passed in Maryland and Vermont both state that the purpose 
of a benefi t corporation is to create a general public benefi t, which is defi ned as 
“a material positive impact on society and the environment, as measured by a third-
party standard, through activities that promote [some] combination of specifi c 
public benefi ts.224 A corporation seeking benefi t corporation status in either state 
must include or make a clear and prominent statement in its articles that it is a 
benefi t corporation.”225 Unlike B Lab’s certifi cation, there are no specifi c criteria to 
qualify as a Maryland or Vermont benefi t corporation so long as proper company 
220 Corporate Social Responsibility Newswire, “Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefi t Corporation 
Legislation” (14 April 2010), online: Corporate Social Responsibility Newswire <http://www.csrwire.
com>; Outdoor Industry Association, “Vermont Becomes Second State to Pass B Corporation Legisla-
tion” (2 June 2010), online: Outdoor Industry Association <http://www.outdoorindustry.org>.
221 Corporations and Associations, Md Code Ann tit 5 § 5-6C-01 (2010) [Maryland Act].
222 Vermont Benefi t Corporations Act, Vt Stat tit 11A § 21 (2011) [Vermont Act]. 
223 In addition to Maryland and Vermont, at the time of this article, benefi t corporation legislation had been 
enacted in California, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Louisiana, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina 
and Virginia, and introduced in Pennsylvania, Colorado and Washington, DC. State by State Status, State 
by State Legislative Status, online: Benefi t Corp Information Center <http://www.benefi tcorp.net>.  
224 Maryland Act, supra note 221, § 5-6C-01(c); Vermont Act, supra note 222, § 21.03(4). ‘Third-party 
standard’ under the Vermont Act means “a standard for defi ning, reporting, and assessing best practices 
in corporate social and environmental performance that: (A) is developed by a person or entity that 
is independent of the benefi t corporation; and (B) is transparent because the following information 
about the standard is publicly available or accessible: (i) the factors considered when measuring the 
performance of a business; (ii) the relative weightings of those factors; and (iii) the identity of the 
persons who developed and control changes to the standard and the process by which those changes 
were made.” Ibid, § 21.03(8). Maryland has similar provisions with some de minimis differences in 
wording. See Maryland Act, supra note 221, § 5-6C-01(e).
225 Ibid, § 5-6C-03, § 5-6C-05; Vermont Act, supra note 222 at § 21.05. If a corporation elects to withdraw 
from its benefi t corporation status, it must obtain two-thirds shareholder approval to amend its 
articles and delete the benefi t corporation statement. The Vermont Act requires a statement from the 
board to explain the reasons why status is being terminated and the effect such termination will 
have on its shareholders. Vermont Act, supra note 222, § 21.07(1).
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approvals have been met. Both states refer to their existing state corporate laws to 
fi ll any holes in the benefi t corporation laws.
A signifi cant aspect of the benefi t corporation laws is the codifi cation of 
stakeholder interests in directorial decision-making. Both Maryland and Vermont outline 
factors to be considered by a director when determining what is in the best interests of 
the benefi t corporation, which in traditional corporate law and practice has referred 
only to shareholder value. In Maryland, benefi t corporation legislation stipulates that 
a director is required to “consider the effects of any action or decision not to act on:”
(1) the stockholders of the benefi t corporation;
(2) the employees and workforce of the benefi t corporation and 
the subsidiaries and suppliers of the benefi t corporation;
(3) the interests of customers as benefi ciaries of the general or 
specifi c public benefi t purposes of the benefi t corporation;
(4) community and societal considerations, including those of 
any community in which offi ces or facilities of the benefi t 
corporation or the subsidiaries or suppliers of the benefi t 
corporation are located; and
(5) the local and global environment.226 
Vermont has an additional sixth factor, encompassing “the long-term 
and short-term interests of the benefi t corporation, including the possibility that 
those interests may be best served by the continued independence of the benefi t 
corporation.”227 In contrast to the standard articulated in Revlon, this addition provides 
substantially the same protection as a similar provision offered by the B Corporation 
model by relieving directors of the duties to maximize shareholder value in a takeover 
situation. The explicit inclusion may offer some symbolic vindication for the state of 
Vermont, home of the socially-minded ice cream business, Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, 
Inc. (popularly known as Ben & Jerry’s), whose board in 2000 had multiple offers 
to purchase the company but had no choice but to sell to the highest offer or risk a 
shareholder lawsuit. The much-publicized takeover by the British-Dutch conglomerate 
Unilever hit a nerve for many in Vermont, and the social enterprise sector in general.228 
226 Maryland Act, supra note 221, § 5-6C-07(a)(1). Vermont has similar provisions with some de minimis 
differences in wording. See Vermont Act, supra note 222, § 21.09(a).
227 Ibid, § 21.09(a)(1)(F).
228 Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Press Release, “Ben & Jerry’s and Unilever to Join Forces” (12 April 
2000), online: Ben & Jerry’s <http://www.lickglobalwarming.org/company/media-center/press/
archives.cfm>. The much publicized takeover of Ben & Jerry’s Homemade by Unilever is a frequent 
bitter example cited by social entrepreneurs. See e.g. Dave Gram, “States Move to Let Firms Pursue 
Social Mission,” The Seattle Times (11 April 2010). But see Anthony Page & Robert A Katz, “Freezing 
Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale of a Social Enterprise Icon” (2010) 35 Vt L Rev 211 
(which argues that Ben & Jerry’s had strict anti-takeover defenses that their board declined to test, 
and that negative reactions to the sale of social enterprises may be misguided as such sales may create 
more opportunities for social enterprises to do good work).
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 In Maryland, the director has no duty (fi duciary or otherwise) to a person 
who is a general public benefi ciary of the benefi t corporation. Vermont, however, 
has actually gone a step further in expanding the defi nition of fi duciary duties for 
their directors.229 Vermont directors have fi duciary duties only to those persons 
entitled to bring about enforcement proceedings against the benefi t corporation, 
who have specifi cally been identifi ed as:
(1) a shareholder that would otherwise be entitled to commence 
or maintain a proceeding in the right of the benefi t corporation 
on any basis;
(2) a director of the corporation;
(3) a person or group of persons that owns benefi cially or of 
record 10 percent or more of the equity interests in an entity 
of which the benefi t corporation is a subsidiary; or
(4) such other persons as may be specifi ed in the articles of 
incorporation of the benefi t corporation.230 
 A benefi t enforcement proceeding means a claim or action against a 
director or offi cer for failing to pursue the public benefi t purpose set forth in its 
articles, or for violating any duty in the statute. While the expansion may seem 
slight, it is important. Shareholders, and shareholders of any parent company, 
can bring proceedings against the benefi t corporation for violating the broader, 
codifi ed stakeholder interests. Furthermore, a benefi t corporation also has the 
freedom to specifi cally include any other persons with rights to bring proceedings 
in their articles.231 
Both Maryland and Vermont require benefi t corporations to be responsible 
for creating an annual benefi t report, with Vermont requiring board approval prior 
to the report being sent out to shareholders.232 The report in both states is required 
229 Vermont Act, supra note 222 at § 21.09(e).
230 Ibid at § 21.13(b).
231 Vermont’s expansion of duties thus has required setting out proper parameters of the directors’ duties. 
Directors are not required to give priority to the interest of any particular person or group over the 
interests of any other person or group unless the benefi t corporation has stated its intention of giving 
priority in its articles. See Vermont Act, supra note 222, § 21.09(a)(3). Directors are also not subject to 
a different or higher standard of care when decisions may affect the control of the benefi t corporation, 
ibid, § 21.09(a)(4). As well, a director is not liable for the failure of a benefi t corporation to create 
general or specifi c public benefi t. In both states, directors have the same immunity from liability as 
directors of those corporations generally.
232 Maryland Act, supra note 221, § 5-6C-08(a); Vermont Act, supra note 222, § 21.14(a).Vermont has also 
created the requirement for one member of the board of directors to be designated as a benefi t 
director.  The benefi t director is required to prepare an annual statement detailing whether, in the 
opinion of the director, the company acted in accordance with its benefi t purpose in all material 
respects during the period covered by the report. If the benefi t director believes the corporation or its 
directors or offi cers failed in its mission, then the statement should include a description of the ways 
in which they failed to so act. See ibid, § 21.10. 
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to include: (1) a description of how the benefi t corporation pursued a public benefi t 
during the year and the extent to which the public benefi t was created; (2) any 
circumstances that hindered the creation of the public benefi t; and (3) an assessment 
of the societal and environmental performance of the benefi t corporation, prepared 
in accordance with a third-party standard.233 Vermont also requires the inclusion of 
the amount of compensation paid to each director and the name of each share holder 
owning fi ve percent or more of the shares.234 These additions add a heightened level 
of transparency and accountability that echoes some of the disclosure requirements 
of public companies.235 
The development of these benefi t corporation laws promotes a more 
stakeholder-based model with supporting infrastructure to encourage an active 
level of social responsibility. In combination with the B Corporation certifi cation, 
which provides a normative component through its Rating System, a potential 
solution has been created to combat negative corporate behaviour that may be 
damaging to broader community, environmental and other stakeholder interests. 
D. Way Forward
State-led initiatives that attempt to reform the shareholder primacy model are a 
step in the right direction. It is important to realize, however, that state-led reform 
is vulnerable to federal legislative authority. This is despite the “internal affairs” 
doctrine, which has been articulated in federal decisions as implying that states 
hold the power “to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to defi ne the 
rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares.”236 Mark J. Roe has detailed how 
the federal government has frequently breached the doctrine separating state and 
federal powers.237 He notes how this federal encroachment has been done formally, 
such as under the SOX Act and related initiatives that affect board structure and 
authority, and “informally when federal authorities, under the guise of regulating 
external corporate action—say, disclosure to securities markets—effectively 
233 Vermont has also required a statement of the specifi c goals or outcomes, and actions that can be taken 
to attain them while improving its social and environmental performance. See Vermont Act, supra note 
222, § 21.14(a)(1)(D). See also supra note 224 (for more on the third-party standard).
234 Ibid at § 21.14(a)(4)-(7).
235 This annual benefi t report is to be delivered to each shareholder within 120 days following the end 
of the benefi t corporation’s fi scal year. See Vermont Act, supra note 222, § 21.14(b) (which states that 
Vermont also allows delivery to be at the same time that the benefi t corporation delivers any other 
annual report to its shareholders). Vermont’s legislation also states that, after reasonable opportunity 
for review, the shareholders of the benefi t corporation must either approve or reject the annual 
benefi t report by majority vote at the annual meeting of shareholders or at a special meeting held for 
that purpose. If the benefi t corporation has a public website, the benefi t corporation is required to 
post its most recent benefi t report on the public portion of its website. See ibid, § 21.14(d). See also 
Maryland Act, supra note 221, § 5-6C-08(b), (c). 
236 CTS Corporation v Dynamics Corporation of America, 481 US 69, 107 S ct 1637 at 1650, 95 L Ed (2d) 67 
(1987).
237 Mark J Roe, “Delaware’s Competition” (2003) 117:2 Harv L Rev 588.
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assume control over the underlying governance structure of the corporation ….”238 
Reform at the state level is compelling, but in order to permanently recalibrate 
existing power structures, there must be agreement, or at least passive acceptance, 
at the federal level. As Roe put it, “[w]hat remains with the states is the corporate 
law that the federal players tolerate, and what gets reversed is that which they do 
not.”239 Therefore, when considering alternative approaches, multifaceted reform 
efforts at both the state and federal level may be required to reconfi gure effi ciency 
within corporate structures, as “[t]he structure of corporate law [is inevitably] a 
mixed federal-state one….”240 
Critiques by old and new institutional scholars of the Chicago School 
approach are effective in deconstructing the effi ciency premises on which the 
shareholder primacy model stands. Through the neoclassical law and economics 
lens, “singular solutions” are given to issues which “refl ect only one particular set 
of value premises and one particular conception of the facts, benefi ts, and costs 
at issue …,” whereas institutional approaches “by recognizing the multiplicity 
of potential solutions and underlying value premises, [attempt] to fl esh out the 
alternative possibilities that are open to society in the ongoing social construction 
and reconstruction of legal-economic reality.”241 Institutional and new institutional 
critiques draw attention to the prospect of alternative structures in which corpo-
rations can thrive—structures that do not require the concept of (and, indeed, 
desire for) effi ciency to be thrown out. Instead, effi ciency can be normatively 
reconceptualized to move beyond the narrowness of increasing share value, and 
broadened into the social context in which corporations clearly hold formidable 
power and infl uence. 
Workable solutions, and their accompanying measures of achievement, 
continue to be a source of contention for those in the fi eld of corporate law. But 
considering alternative approaches reawakens oneself to the possibilities that are 
available. Broader reform efforts should be empowered by new corporate structures 
created by state governments that allow for the dual corporate mission of creating 
profi t and social benefi t. There is presently the opportunity to reassess long-held 
beliefs in corporate law; indeed, reconsidering the existing corporate governance 
model may never be as timely as now.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article provides a contemporary macro-level analysis on the longstanding 
debate for and against shareholder primacy. It identifi es and organizes key scholarly 
perspectives within the debate and tracks their evolution alongside the volatile 
238 Ibid at 597.
239 Ibid at 644.
240 Ibid at 644-45. 
241 Mercuro & Medema, supra note 12 at 240.
231Corporate Governance Reform for the 21st Century: 
A Critical Reassessment of the Shareholder Primacy Model
fi nancial environment that has defi ned the world’s entrance into the 21st century.
Topical narratives from within the global fi nancial crisis illustrate how reform efforts 
in the wake of the crisis have been too limited in scope. Time and again we have 
seen how large public institutions, while operating within the confi nes of the law, 
focus on profi t maximization and increasing share value. Then, following calamitous 
events, important fi gures scrutinize what went wrong and reform efforts take 
place.242 Reform efforts targeted at the fi nancial market level are indeed necessary, 
but there is a disservice in classifying the crisis as a one-off event resulting from 
specifi c failures in fi nancial regulation, since legislative changes become limited to 
addressing only those concerns. This article draws upon the fi nancial crisis as an 
example of an ongoing dysfunction in the high-level governance model of corporate 
and fi nancial institutions. The legal and ideological support of the shareholder 
primacy model of governance has laid the groundwork for corporate behaviour 
that heavily influences regulatory inaction and perpetuates the likelihood of 
future crises.
Across the Atlantic, there have been indications that European regulators 
are aware that their existing corporate governance model will need to be reformed. 
A green paper produced by the European Commission (EC) outlining several 
governance initiatives states: “[t]he fi nancial crisis has shown that confi dence in 
the model of the shareholder-owner who contributes to the company’s long-term 
viability has been severely shaken, to say the least.”243 As a direct result of the crisis, 
the EC announced the launch of a broader review of corporate governance within 
publicly listed companies in general.244 In the US, however, negligible governance 
reform measures found within the fi nancial regulatory overhaul mean that very 
little will change in the way US corporate and fi nancial institutions involved in 
the crisis will ultimately govern themselves.The US government has placed a high 
priority on modifying securities regulation to curtail specifi c market behavior 
without any changes to address the fl aws within the existing governance model 
itself. This is despite evidence that governance structures designed to prevent events 
such as the mortgage meltdown have not only failed, but have incentivized the 
obstruction of effi cient regulation.
Governance reform operates on two levels. The fi rst level of reform attempts 
to make the actors in an existing model more accountable to the roles they are 
supposed to play in that model. The other level reconsiders the very model itself. 
It asks, what are the legal principles that we want to guide our corporate laws? 
242 See Uchitelle, “Loud and Clear,” supra note 176 (where Paul Volcker, sharing this view, was quoted 
saying, “There is a certain circularity in all this business ….  You have a crisis, followed by some kind 
of reform, for better or worse, and things go well for a while, and then you have another crisis”).
243 European Commission, Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and Remuneration Policies 
(Brussels: European Commission, June 2010) at 8, online: European Commission, Green Papers 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/com2010_284_en.pdf>.
244 Ibid at 9-19.
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After all, the devastating fi nancial effects from the crisis not only remind us that 
humans and structures are fallible, but they also signify that something is seriously 
amiss with the perceived effi ciencies embodied in the dominant corporate model.
The model accepted as the norm has justifi ed selfi sh human behavior, while ignoring 
the broader community that corporations inevitably impact.This article provides a 
starting point to reconfi gure the conversation. It points to alternative approaches, 
and provides examples where corporate structures are being mani pulated in state 
laws to encompass broader stakeholder interests in corporate decision-making. 
These are steps in the right direction. Corporate governance reform needs to be 
made a part of any sweeping overhaul of the fi nancial system, which moves beyond 
reinforcing the shareholder primacy model. As we move forward in the 21st century, 
it is time to rethink the governance design of the modern corporate institution.
